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NOTES
Article III Limits on Article I Courts:
The Coiistitutionality of the Bankruptcy Court
and the 1979 Magistrate Act
In providing for the establishment of a federal judiciary, article III,
section 1, of the Constitution1 appears to require Congress to grant federal

judges life tenure2 and undiminishable salaries. In some circumstances,
however, Congress has established federal tribunals that do not comply with

the requirements of article 111,3 relying on the doctrine of legislative, or

article I, courts.4 Recently, in response to caseload pressures burdening
the federal district courts, Congress has drawn upon this doctrine to create

an article I bankruptcy court and to expand the judicial powers of magisstrates.5 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19786 establishes a bankruptcy
1. The section provides:

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and

in such inferior Coturts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.

The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compenlsation,

which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

U.S. Const. art. III, ? 1. Congress's power, set out in art. I, ? 8, to create inferior federal
courts has been construed to refer only to courts described in article III, and thus appears to
be limited by the requirements of that article. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543
(1962); C. Wright, Federal Courts ? 11, at 30-31 (3d ed. 1976); Katz, Federal Legislative
Courts, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 894, 894 n.2 (1930).
2. "Good Behaviour" has always been taken to mean tenure for life, with removal only
according to the impeachment standard set forth in article II, ? 4. See, e.g., O'Donoghue v.

United States, 289 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1933).

3. A federal court is considered an article I court if its judges do not have life tenure

and constitutionally protected salaries. In addition, article I courts are not limited to hearing
cases comprised within the article III grant of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ex

Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929); C. Wright, supra note 1, ? 11.
4. The term-and much of the doctrine-derives from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion
in American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828), discussed at notes 88-92 and
accompanying text infra, in which the Justice contrasted "constitutional" courts, established
by Congress in accordance with article III, with "legislative" courts, which need not meet
those requirements. Legislative courts are now primarily referred to as article I courts, because many of these tribunals are established as "necessary and proper" exercises of an article
I, ? 8, legislative power. See notes 118-29 and accompanying text infra.
For general discussions of the doctrine, see 1 Moore's Federal Practice ? 0.4 (2d ed.
1979); C. Wright, supra note 1, ? 11.

5. The litigation explosion of recent years has severely taxed the resources of the federal
judicial system at all levels, generating considerable comment and a variety of proposals for
reform. Relief for overburdened district judges was a primary objective of the original
Magistrate Act in 1968. See H.R. Rep. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1968), reprinted
in [1968] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4252, 4257. Caseload pressures have motivated the
continued expansion of magisti ates' powers. See Silberman, Masters and Maoistrates Part
II: The American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1297, 1298 (1975); Note, Article III Constraints and the Expanding Civil Jurisdiction of Federal Magistrates: A Dissenting View, 88
Yale L.J. 1023, 1027-28 & n.27 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as Article III and Magistrates]. The need to free bankruptcy cases from the overburdened dockets of the district

courts was a major impetus for creating a new bankruptcy court. See Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. oni the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., Constitutional Bankruptcy Courts 8-9 (Comm. Print No. 3 1977) [hereinafter cited as Comm. Print
No. 3].

6. Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. II, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. ?? 151-160,

771-775, 1471-1482 (Supp. 1979)). The Act is further discussed at notes 14-34 and ac-

companying text infra.
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court staffed by judges who will have fourteen-year terms7 and unprotected

salaries,8 and who may be removed from office for a variety of nonimpeachalble offenses.9 The Magistrate Act of 197910 authorizes magistrates, who
are appointed by district judges to serve eight-year terms,"1 to render final

judgment in civil cases and criminal misdemeanor cases referred to them by
district judges. Both of these enactments boldly expand existing limits on
the doctrine of legislative courts,12 and thus raise serious questions about
the scope of congressional power to delegate article III judicial power to
non-article-III tribunals.'3
This Note analyzes the constitutionality of the new bankruptcy court
and the Magistrate Act in light of the current rationales for article I courts,
and concludes that neither can be justified under existing conceptions of the

limits on congressional power to create tribunals that do not comply with
the requirements of article III. The Note argues, however, that these con-

ceptions do not resolve the constitutional question completely, because they
do not satisfactorily suggest how far Congress may go beyond the existing
limits of the doctrine. Moreover, these rationales are inadequate because
they fail to give proper weight to the values underlying article III. Accordingly, the Note concludes that the constitutionality of any article I court
must be evaluated in light of article III policies. The Note then applies an
article III policy analysis to the bankruptcy and magistrate systems, and
concludes that both are fundamentally at odds with the values article III
was designed to protect.

To lay the foundation for this constitutional analysis, the first section
of the Note examines the purposes, structure, and conceptual underpinnings
of the new bankruptcy court and the expanded powers of magistrates.
I. THE BANKRUPTCY COURT AND THE MAGISTRATE SYSTEM AS
ARTICLE I COURTS

Although somewhat different in purpose and conceptual basis, the new
bankruptcy and magistrate systems employ similar mechanisms for the re7. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 153(a) (Supp. 1979).
8. Id. ? 154. See note 54 and accompanying text infra.
9. Id. ? 153(b). See notes 57-59 and accompanying text infra.

10. Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643 (1979) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. ?? 631, 633, 636;

18 U.S.C.A. ? 3401 (Supp. 1980)).
11. 28 U.S.C. ? 631(a)-(h) (1976).
12. See notes 88-145 and accompanying text infra.

13. Many of these questions were raised and considered in congressional hearings on the
bankruptcy and magistrate systems. See generally Bankruptcy Court Revision: Hearings
on H.R. 8200 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Court Hear-

ings]; Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 2d Sess., Report on Hearings on the Court Administration Structure for Bankruptcy Cases (Comm. Print No. 13 1977) [hereinafter cited as Comm. Print. No. 13]; Comm.
Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 18-33; Jurisdiction of United States Magistrates: Hearings on S.
1283 before the Subcomm. On Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Sen. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. Rep. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976);
H.R. Rep. No. 1364, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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form of judicial administration. Each system establishes a structure of
judicial officers unprotected by article III's tenure and salary guarantees as
auxiliaries to the district courts. These nontenured officers are empowered
to enter binding judgments in a broad range of cases falling within the subject matter limits of article III.

A. Purposes and Structure
The new bankruptcy court is designed to correct two critical deficiencies

of the old bankruptcy referee system. The first, and most pressing, problem

was the narrow jurisdiction exercised by bankruptcy referees.14 Under the
old system, referees could hear only cases involving the actual disposition

of debtors' property, or "summary" suits."5 Other claims affecting the
debtor's assets but not involving distribution to creditors were deemed
"plenary" suits, and had to be filed and tried separately in federal district

or state courts.16 Besides encouraging costly and time-consuming juris-

dictional disputes,17 this bifurcated system often produced judgments in
plenary suits that conflicted with or otherwise hampered the referee's determinations in liquidation or reorganization proceedings.18
The second principal deficiency of the referee system was its lack of
independence from the district courts.19 Referees could only hear suits

referred to them by district judges and were dependent on district judges to
confirm their recommendations.20 Consequently, bankruptcy proceedings

14. The need for expanded jurisdiction was the most frequently cited reason for reform-

ing the system for adjudicating bankruptcy claims. See generally Bankruptcy Court
Hearings, supra note 13; Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before
the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess., pt. 4, at 2736-37 (1975-1976); Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 88-92,
pt. 2, at 30-33 (1973); Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 7-8.
15. For a description of the jurisdiction of bankruptcy referees, see Comm. Print No.
3, supra note 5, at 2-5; Comm. Print No. 13, supra note 13, at 1-3. In "summary" suits, the
court is deemed in possession of the debtor's property, and can only dispose of property in
its possession. Summary suits thus include little more than creditors' claims against debtors.
For a discussion of the limits of summary jurisdiction, see Note, Scope of the Summary
Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court, 40 Colum. L. Rev. 489 (1940). See also Forum,
Bankruptcy Reform: A New Judiciary, 48 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 367, 369-71 (1979).
16. Plenary matters might include suits by the trustee against the bankrupt's debtors, or
matters with potentially great impact on the bankrupt's assets, such as labor or contract
disputes. The district judge or referee sitting in bankruptcy may hear a plenary suit only if

the defendant to that suit consents. See, e.g., Comm. Print No. 13, supra note 13, at 2-3;
Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 2-4. Consent, however, was often constructive, imputed
from certain procedural lapses or actions by the adverse party. See Broude, Jurisdiction

and Venue Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1973, 48 Am. Bankr. L.J. 231, 233 (1974); Forum,

supra note 15, at 370.

17. See Bankruptcy Court Hearings, supra note 13, at 194 (statement of John W.

Ingraham); Comm. Print No. 13, supra note 13, at 2.

18. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1978), reprinted in [1978]

U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5787, 5803-04; Bankruptcy Court Hearings, supra note 13, at

18-27 (statement of J. Stanley Shaw).
19. Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 9-12.

20. Under the system in effect until the Bankruptcy Reform Act is fully implemented
on April 1, 1984, see Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. IV, ? 402(b), bankruptcy jurisdiction is first
vested in the district courts. 11 U.S.C. ?? 1(10), lla (1976). District judges refer nearly
all bankruptcy proceedings to bankruptcy referees, although the judges may retain any case
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were subject to the delays inherent in the district courts' overcrowded

dockets.2' The subordinate position of referees also diminished the prestige
of the office and reduced the respect accorded their decisions.22 Thus, by
fostering delay and inharmonious adjudications, the limited jurisdiction and
dependent status of referees frustrated the bankruptcy system's principal
goal of swiftly rehabilitating debtors.23

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 seeks to remedy these problems
through two sweeping reforms. First, in order to provide a forum capable

of quickly and uniformly resolving all disputes that affect a given debtor,
it greatly expands the jurisdiction of federal bankruptcy tribunals by elimi-

nating the summary/plenary distinction.24 The new bankruptcy courts have
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings ansing under, or "related to" cases

arising under, the substantive federal bankruptcy laws.25 Although limited
in principle to a narrow class of federal question cases,26 the scope of the
jurisdiction of the new bankruptcy courts, which encompasses claims based
on both federal and state law,27 will equal, and in some instances exceed,

for themselves. The referees are salaried court employees appointed by the judges of the
court for six-year terms. 11 U.S.C. ?? 61, 62 (1976). Rule 901 of the Bankruptcy Rules,
promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1974, 415 U.S. 1003 (1974), confers the title of
"bankruptcy judge" on the referees. To distinguish these court officers from the new fullfledged bankruptcy judges, this Note will continue to use the designation "referee."
Referees perform some administrative duties, such as appointing trustees or supervising
estate liquidation, but they primarily resolve disputes between creditors and debtors. The
authority to enter final judgment in such disputes remains with the district judge. 11 U.S.C.
? 66 (1976). See Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 2-6; Comm. Print No. 13, supra
note 13, at 1-3.
21. See Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 8-11.
22. Id.

23. Id.
24. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 5963, 6010.
25. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 1471(b) (1979 Supp.). This grant of jurisdiction became effective immediately, on Oct. 1, 1979.
If a case falling within this jurisdictional grant is not filed originally in the bankruptcy
court, it may be removed to the bankruptcy court. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 1478 (1979 Supp.).
26. Presumably the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court would be limited to matters in
bankruptcy falling within Congress's power to make uniform bankruptcy regulations, U.S.
Const. art. I, ? 8, cl. 4, since that clause is the source of Congress's power to establish the
court.

27. The House report makes clear that "[alctions that formerly had to be tried in
State court or in Federal district court, at great cost and delay to the estate, may now be
tried in the bankruptcy courts." H.R. Rep. No. 595, supra note 24, at 445, [1978]
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6400.

Because so many of the disputes related to bankruptcy proceedings are grounded solely
in state law and may now be tried in a congressionally created court regardless of diversity
of citizenship, some have questioned whether bankruptcy cases "arise under" federal law for
purposes of article III jurisdiction. See, e.g., Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 17-19.
This question arises because the plurality opinion in National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater
Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949), concluded, in dictum, that bankruptcy cases were within
article III jurisdiction only when federal law created the cause of action or when there was
diversity of citizenship. Id. at 594-99. Six Justices strongly repudiated the plurality's reasoning and argued that bankruptcy cases are always within the scope of article III. Their
position seems correct in view of the longstanding principle that article III jurisdiction must
be coextensive with Congress's article I, ? 8, legislative powers, because "the Constitution
meant to provide ample means to accomplish its own ends by its own courts," Mitchell v.
Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 17 Fed. Cas. 496, 499 (1843). Therefore, if Congress

pursuant to its article I, ? 8, cl. 4, power to establish uniform bankruptcy laws, concludes
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that of the district courts.28 Indeed, the range of work of the article I bank-

ruptcy judges will be virtually the same as the range of matters heard by

article III district judges.29 The only significant distinction is that a bankruptcy judge's cases will all be in some way related to an underlying
bankruptcy proceeding.

The second major judicial reform instituted by the Bankruptcy Act
strengthens the autonomy of the bankruptcy tribunals.30 Although described

in the Act as "adjuncts" of the district courts,3l the new bankruptcy courts
will be substantially independent. As courts of original jurisdiction, they
will control their own dockets.82 In addition, although they may not enjoin
that state law claims should be adjudicated in federal bankruptcy court, article III judicial
power must necessarily apply to these suits. Otherwise, the congressional power to assure
uniformity would lack substance. See Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Tidewater,
337 U.S. at 652 n.3; Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U.S. 516, 518 (1875)
This conclusion is supported by the Court's decisions in Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S.
642 (1947), upholding federal jurisdiction over state-law-based plenary suits in reorganization
proceedings, and Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367, 371-74 (1934), suggesting that economy
and convenience, rather than article III impediments, were the reason most plenary suits were
left to state courts. These decisions illustrate that where Congress confers jurisdiction to
advance federal interests stemming from an article I legislative power, the cases "arise under"
federal law, even though the substantive decision may rest on state law. P. Bator, P. Mishkin,
D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System
416-17, 868-69 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Hart & Wechsler]. State law claims related
to a bankruptcy proceeding are thus within the scope of article III federal question jurisdiction,
and may be committed to an article III court. See Bondurant, The Bankruptcy Court as a
Constitutional Court, 45 Am. Bankr. L.J. 235, 237-39 (1971).
28. The potential breadth of this expanded jurisdiction is illustrated by the congressional
testimony of an attorney who handled the bankruptcy reorganization of a major supermarket
chain. Bankruptcy Court Hearings, supra note 13, at 18-27 (statement of J. Stanley Shaw).
State law claims arising during the five-year reorganization included disputes over the validity
of contracts, landlord-tenant relationships, reclamation of goods, foreclosures of security
interests, and alleged torts. Id. At the same time the bankrupt was the defendant in an action
to enforce collective bargaining agreements and a title VII employment discrimination action
filed in response to massive layoffs. The trustee initiated an antitrust action against several
of the supermarket's suppliers and a securities fraud action against the parent corporation.
Id. Because each of these state and federal law disputes affected the bankrupt's assets,
financial condition, and obligations, they were all "related to" the underlying reorganization
proceeding, and thus would be within the expanded jurisdiction of the new bankruptcy court.
29. See Bankruptcy Court Hearings, supra note 13, at 113 (statement of Hon. Wesley
Brown); id. at 57-58 (testimony of Hon. Simon H. Rifkind).

30. The House Judiciary Committee originally proposed an article III bankruptcy court
entirely separate from the district courts, see H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977), because
the subcommittee studying the problem, the full Judiciary Committee, the Attorney General,
and his Office of Legal Counsel all concluded that the necessary expanded jurisdiction could
be exercised constitutionally only by a court created in accordance with the requirements of
article III. See Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 18-33 (subcommittee's position); H.R.
Rep. No. 595, supra note 24, at 52 (1977) (Judiciary Committee view); Bankruptcy Court
Hearings, supra note 13, at 216 (testimony of Att'y Gen. Griffin Bell); Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2266 & H.R. 8200 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 548 (1977)
(Office of Legal Counsel position) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
This proposal, though approved by the Judiciary Committee, encountered strong political
opposition stemming from fears that a separate court of equal rank would diminish the
prestige and influence of the district courts. The opponents were successful, and the original
version of H.R. 8200 never passed the House. See Comm. Print No. 13, supra note 13, at
1, 5-9.

31. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 151(a) (1979 Supp.).
32. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 1471(c) (1979 Supp.) provides that "[t]he bankruptcy court for the

district in which a case under title II is commenced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction con-

ferred . . . on the district courts." (Emphasis added.)

This language implies that all bankruptcy claims must be heard by bankruptcy judges.
District judges formerly had discretion to refer matters to referees. 11 U.S.C. ? 66 (1976).
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another court or punish certain kinds of criminal contempt, they will
exercise the other inherent powers of an article III federal court, including
the powers to enter final judgments and issue writs of execution.3 Thus
endowed with nearly the full array of judicial powers, the new bankruptcy

courts will be able to resolve disputes expeditiously, without time-consuming
references from, and recommendations to, the district courts. Despite these
increased elements of independence, however, bankruptcy judges will still
be subject to the disciplinary and removal power of the other federal judges
in the circuit.4

Unlike the Bankruptcy Act, the Magistrate Act of 1979 is not designed
to remedy distinctive problems affecting the adjudication of particular disputes. Instead, it responds to problems-particularly overcrowded dockets

and insufficient manpower-that have hampered all federal courts in recent
years.35 The Act continues the trend inaugurated by the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968,36 which established magistrates as assistants to district
judges,37 by augmenting magistrates' judicial powers and thus expanding
their role from assistants to de facto district judges.
The office of United States magistrate was intended to free district

judges from various procedural and administrative tasks so that they might
devote more time to the actual trial of cases.8 Magistrates are officers of
the district court, who, prior to the 1979 Act, were empowered to determine
nondispositive pretrial motions; 39 conduct evidentiary hearings and recommend dispositions in summary civil proceedings,40 including prisoner peti33. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 1481 (1979 Supp.): "A bankruptcy court shall have the powers of a
court of equity, law, and admiralty, but may not enjoin another court or punish a criminal
contempt not committed in the presence of the judge of the court or warranting a punishment
of imprisonment." The limit on the criminal contempt power stems from the view that
federal criminal penalties may be imposed only by an article III court because of due process

and the protections of the sixth amendment. See, e.g., O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258,
262-64 (1969); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17-18 (1955). Proponents
of an article I bankruptcy court suggested limiting the criminal contempt power to overcome
constitutional difficulties with the article I structure. See Bankruptcy Court Hearings, supra
note 13, at 89 (testimony of Hon. Shirley Hufstedler), 137 (testimony of Hon. Ruggiero

Aldisert), 217 (testimony of Att'y Gen. Griffin Bell).
34. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 153(b) (1979 Supp.).
35. See note 5 supra.

36. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (codified at 18 U.S.C. ?? 3401-3402; 28 U.S.C.

?? 604, 631-639 (1976).

37. The 1979 Act is the second major expansion of magistrates' powers since the 1968
Act was passed. In 1976 Congress amended the 1968 Act to empower magistrates to hear
potentially dispositive pretrial motions and to conduct evidentiary hearings on prisoners'
habeas corpus petitions, Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729 (1976) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
? 636(b) (1) (B) (1976)).

38. See, e.g., Hearings on the Federal Magistrates Act Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d

Sess. 66 (1968) (testimony of Committee Counsel Poff); H.R. Rep. No. 1609, 94th Cong.,

2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6162, 6166.
39. 28 U.S.C. ? 636(b) (1) (A) (1976). Under this section, magistrates routinely resolve
pretrial discovery disputes. For a description of magistrates' pretrial authority, see Silberman,

supra note 5, at 1338-40.

40. 28 U.S.C. ? 636(b) (1) (B) (1976).

The recommended disposition procedure is frequently used to have magistrates
administrative determinations regarding entitlement to benefits. See Silberman, sup
at 1334-38. This procedure comports with article III only if authority and responsib
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tions for post-conviction relief;4' and serve as special masters to assist the
court with factfinding.42 These tasks did not entail the exercise of "judicial
power"43-ultimate adjudicatory authority always remained with the district judge." Under the scheme of the 1968 Act, a magistrate's hearing
report consisted of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
was subject to the district judge's de novo review.45 Indeed, courts reviewing the permissible scope of magistrates' duties have stressed that the

district judge's retention of final decisionmaking authority is necessary to
avoid article III infirmities.46
rendering a final judgment remains with the district judge. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261,

269 n.5, 271 (1976).
41. Authorization in ? 636(b) (1) (B) for magistrates to hear applications for post-trial

relief, or habeas corpus petitions, was added by the 1976 Amendments to the Magistrates Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729 (1976). This amendment was designed to overrule the

Supreme Court's decision in Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974), which construed the

Federal Habeas Corpus Act and the Magistrates Act to require an article III judge to hear
habeas petitions. The Court feared that, despite review by district judges, habeas petitions
would be adjudicated de facto by magistrates, resulting in abdication of the judicial function
to the detriment of article III. Article III and Magistrates, supra note 5, at 1044. These
constitutional doubts appear well founded. See notes 46 & 203-23 and accompanying text
infra.
42. The use of magistrates as special masters is limited to the situations detailed in Fed.
R. Civ. P. 53 unless the parties consent to a broader use of the magistrate as master. 28 U.S.C.
? 636(b) (2) (1976). See Silberman, supra note 5, at 1321-32.
43. See notes 139-43 and accompanying text infra.

44. Under the 1968 Act, only a judge could order entry of final executory judgments,

enjoin behavior, or issue contempt citations. To the extent local court rules seem to provide
otherwise, courts of appeals have continued to insist on district judge participation. See
notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text infra.
The only apparent exception to the rule of judicial participation is the statute authorizing
magistrates to conduct trials of minor criminal offenses when the defendant consents. See
28 U.S.C. ? 636(a) (3) (1976), which gives magistrates the jurisdiction described in 18 U.S.C.
? 3401(a), to "try persons accused of, and sentence persons convicted of, minor offenses
committed within that judicial district." The defendant may elect, however, to be tried by an
article III judge. 18 U.S.C. ? 3401(b) (1976). This provision sparked extensive constitutional
debate in hearings on the 1968 Magistrates Act. Its supporters argued that petty offenses had
long been considered an implied exception to article III and the right to a jury trial, and that

the defendant's consent vitiated any constitutional difficulties. See generally Note, The Validity
of United States Magistrates' Criminal Jurisdiction, 60 Va. L. Rev. 697 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Magistrates' Criminal Jurisdiction]. Justices Black and Douglas, on the other hand,
concluded that minor offenses are not excepted from the sixth amendment or article III, and

thus that this provision of the Magistrates Act was unconstitutional. Accordingly, they dissented from the adoption of Court rules based upon the Act, 51 F.R.D. 206, 209 (1971)
(Black, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has never passed on this issue directly.
45. Parties have the right under 28 U.S.C. ? 636(b) (1) (1976) to object to a magistrate's
findings. The judge must then determine the matter objected to de novo. Moreover, whether
or not the parties object, "[a] judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate. The judge may also
receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate with instructions." Id.
46. See, e.g., Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976) (although declining to reach
constitutional issues, the Court intimated article III was satisfied bcause "[tthe authorityand the responsibility-to make an informed, final determiation ... remains with the judge");
United States v. Raddatz, 592 F.2d 976, 982 (7th Cir.) (Magistrates Act "clearly requires
the Article III judge to make a de novo determination. Article III is therefore satisfied."),
cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 44 (1979) (No. 79-8); Sick v. City of Buffalo, 574 F.2d 689, 692-93
(2d Cir. 1978); Noorlander v. Ciccone, 489 F.2d 642, 648 (8th Cir. 1973); TPO, Inc. v.
McMillen, 460 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1972). Courts of appeals have insisted on preserving the
district judge's role by refusing to accept appeals from magistrate-conducted cases unless the
judge has reviewed the case and entered final judgment. See Horton v. State St. Bank &
Trust Co., 590 F.2d 403 (1st Cir. 1979); Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1978);
Sick v. City of Buffalo, 574 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1978); Reciprocal Exch. v. Noland, 542 F.2d
462 (8th Cir. 1976).
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The Magistrate Act of 1979, which parallels local court rules now in

effect in some districts,47 provides further relief for overburdened district
courts by authorizing complete trial by magistrate, eliminating the requirement of de novo district court review. Under the Act, district judges may
refer civil proceedings, including jury trials and criminal misdemeanor

proceedings, to a magistrate for determination.48 If the parties consent to
such a reference,49 the magistrate may then hear, determine, and enter a final
judgment in the matter.50 Thus, the Act essentially vests magistrates with
full judicial power and makes them complete substitutes for article III

district judges. Magistrates will potentially have jurisdiction of any civil case

now within the cognizance of federal district courts, with no apparent limits
on their coercive, executory authority.5l

Despite the similarity of their power and jurisdiction to that of district
judges, neither the new bankruptcy judges nor federal magistrates will be
article III judges. Bankruptcy judges, appointed by the President subject

to Senate confirmation,52 will serve fourteen-year terms,53 and their salaries
may be subject to adjustment.54 Federal magistrates will continue to be

47. Local rules in some districts go beyond the statutorily delineated duties in the 1968

Act and permit magistrates to conduct civil trials, including jury trials, when the parties
consent. See Hearings on Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction/Magistrates Reform Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1977) (memorandum on number of
magistrate trials prepared by Administrative Office of the United States Courts and Department
of Justice) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Hearings]. For an example of such a local rule and its
application in a jury trial, see Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1979).
Prior to the 1979 Act, statutory authorization for such rules authorizing magistrate trials
was purportedly provided by 28 U.S.C. ? 636(b) (3) (1976), which permits magistrates to
perform "such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States." The legislative history of this provision indicates, however, that Congress
contemplated that these "additional duties" would largely be administrative or pretrial, leaving
more time for trials to the judges. H.R. Rep. No. 1609, supra note 38, at 2, 4, 6-7, [1976]
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6162-66. See also Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247,
1251 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J., dissenting); Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir.
1978).
48. Pub. L. No. 96-82, ?2, 93 Stat. 643 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. ?636(c)(1) (1980

Supp.)) (civil matters); id. ??7(a), (b) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. ? 3401(a) (1980 Supp.))
(misdemeanors).
49. 28 U.S.C.A. ?636(c)(1), (c)(2) (1980 Supp.). The statute's consent procedure is

designed to shield litigants from judicial pressure to accept the reference and thereby to avoid
"forced consent." Systemic pressures, however, may prove harder to avoid. See notes 218
& 219 and accompanying text infra; Article III and Magistrates, supra note 5, at 1051 &
nn.150 & 151.

50. 28 U.S.C.A. ?636(c)(3) (1980 Supp.).
51. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 636(c) (3) (1980 Supp.) is quite explicit in substituting a magistrate
for a district judge. The 1979 Magistrate Act has no section limiting the powers of magis-

trates, whereas the Bankruptcy Reform Act does limit the coercive reach of bankruptcy judges,
see note 33 and accompanying text supra.
52. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 152 (1979 Supp.).
53. Id. ? 153(a).

54. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 154 (1979 Supp.). This section provides for cost-of-living adjustments.

Congress recently refused to appropriate the full amount necessary to make these adjustments,
Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1979, at 24, col. 4. In Will v. United States, 478 F. Supp. 621 (N.D.
Ill. 1979), juris. postponed, 100 S. Ct. 1010, (1980) (No. 79-983), several article III judges
challenged a similar congressional action. The district court held that article III guaranteed
the judges the full salary increase, so that Congress's action amounted to an unconstitutional
salary diminution. Article I judges would be subject to the salary reduction.
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appointed by a majority vote of the district court judges of each district55
to serve eight-year terms.

Although under current law an individual magistrate's salary cannot be
reduced during his term of office, this statutory protection can, of course, be
modified or abolished.56 Both bankruptcy judges and magistrates can be
removed from office for "incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or
physical or mental disability," the former by a majority vote of the judicial
council of their circuit,57 the latter by a similar vote of the district judges of
their district.58 Because these are not impeachable "high crimes and misdemeanors," the removal provisions also fail to comport with the life tenure
guarantee in article III.59

Because they do not enjoy life tenure and undiminishable salaries, the
bankruptcy judges are article I judges; the bankruptcy court is thus an article

I court.60 The magistrate system is also appropriately analyzed under the
doctrine of article I courts. Although prior to the 1979 Act, magistrates
were deemed assistants to article III judges, or "parajudges," rather than
actual article I judges,6' once they start exercising judicial power they will
be, in effect, article I judges, even though they will not staff a separate court
system.62

Litigants appearing before bankruptcy judges and magistrates will not

be, in effect, article I judges, even though they will not staff a separate court
will remain available in article III tribunals. Under the Bankruptcy Act,
final judgments entered by bankruptcy judges may be appealed either

to panels of bankruptcy judges with subsequent recourse to the courts
of appeals,03 or to the district courts.64 Alternatively, bankruptcy appeals

55. In addition, the 1979 Act requires the district courts to establish merit selection
panels to assist the appointment process. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 631(b) (5) (1980 Supp.).
56. Even if an article I judicial officer is granted life tenure and undiminishable salary
by statute, Congress is free to change the statute. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,
593 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

57. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 153(b) (1979 Supp.). Bankruptcy judges are entitled to a preremoval hearing. See In re the Investigation of the Administration of the Bankruptcy Cou

610 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1979).

58. 28 U.S.C. ? 631(h) (1976).

59. See note 1 supra; Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 691-703

(1979).
60. See note 3 supra.

61. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 268 (1976); Article III and Magistrates, supra

note 5, at 1047 n.132.

62. Professor Silberman argues that the legislative court model, although relevant to
analyzing magistrates' authority, provides an "imperfect analogy." Silberman, supra note 5,
at 1310. She reasons that while Congress establishes legislative courts pursuant to a specific
article I, ? 8, power, its sources of authority for creating magistrates are article III and
article II, ? 2 (Congress may vest power to appoint judicial officers in courts). No matter
which article Congress's ultimate authority is grounded in, however, the "necessary and
proper" clause is still the immediate vehicle, and article III concerns still set the overarching
limit on the scope of what is "necessary and proper" in this context. Moreover, when Congress vests article III "judicial power" in a non-article-Ill decisionmaker, whether called an
article I "judge" or a "magistrate," the effect on the principles of article III is the same, and

the doctrine of article I courts therefore provides a useful analytical framework.
63. 28 U.S.C.A. ?? 160, 1293 (1979 Supp.).
64. Id. ? 1334. The district courts will also have jurisdiction of appeals from interlocutory orders, but only by leave of the court. It is interesting to note that the district court
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may be taken directly to the courts of appeals if all parties consent.65
Magistrates' final judgments may be appealed directly to the courts of
appeals just as if they were decisions by district judges.66 Alternatively, the
parties may choose to appeal to the district court, which would not conduct
a de novo review, but would apply normal appellate standards.67
B. Constitutional Saving Devices

Certain provisions of the new court systems incorporate safeguards that
their proponents argued would ensure their constitutionality under article

JJJ.68 For example, the contempt powers of bankruptcy judges are restricted,69 and the power of magistrates to try criminal cases is limited to

"'misdemeanors" in keeping with the view that federal criminal penalties
must ordinarily be imposed by an article III judge.70 In addition, the provi-

sions for appellate review ensure that litigants who appear before bankruptcy judges and magistrates may receive supervision from article III courts
at some stage of the proceedings.71

Moreover, each Act employs a scheme of internal delegation of judicial
power. Neither bankruptcy judges nor magistrates receive power to try
article III cases directly from Congress. Instead, the jurisdiction contem-

plated by each Act is vested, in the first instance, in the district courts and
then transferred to the auxiliary legislative courts. Under the Bankruptcy
Act this transfer is apparently mandatory; the Act confers the expanded
bankruptcy jurisdiction on the district courts, but then provides that the

bankruptcy courts "shall exercise all of the jurisdiction [so] conferred."72
In contrast, the Magistrate Act authorizes district judges to designate a
magistrate to exercise jurisdiction in any given case, provided the parties
consent. Transfer of jurisdiction is thus discretionary with the court, rather

than mandatory. Both systems of internal delegation are thought to cure
possible constitutional defects, because Congress has not technically de-

parted from the normal constitutional scheme of vesting jurisdiction in an

article III court.73 In addition, employing article III courts as jurisdictional

may not refer bankruptcy appeals to a magistrate. Id. ? 1334(c). This perhaps reflects Congress's recognition that bankruptcy litigants may be entitled to an article III judge at some
stage of the proceedings.
65. Id. ? 1293(b).

66. Id. ?636(c)(3) (1980 Supp.).
67. Id. ? 636 (c) (4).

68. See notes 187-223 and accompanying text infra.

69. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 1481 (1979 Supp.). See, e.g., Bankruptcy Court Hearings, supra note 13,
at 137 (testimony of Hon. Ruggiero Aldisert). See note 173 infra.

70. 18 U.S.C.A. ? 3401(a) (1980 Supp.). See generally Magistrates' Criminal Jurisdiction,
supra note 44 (constitutional problems with authorizing magistrates to hear criminal cases).
71. See notes 197-202 and accompanying text infra.
72. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 1471(c) (1979 Supp.).

73. See Bankruptcy Court Hearings, supra note 13, at 89 (testimony of Hon. Shirley
Hufstedler), 137 (testimony of Hon. Ruggiero Aldisert), 217; Senate Hearings, supra note
30, at 548-50 (testimony of Att'y Gen. Griffin Bell).
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intermediaries ensures that the article I tribunals will remain subordinate in
power and status.74

The Magistrate Act incorporates an additional safeguard against con-

stitutional challenge by requiring that magistrates exercise their expanded
powers only upon the consent of the parties.75 Litigants who agree to trial
before a magistrate will thereby waive whatever rights they possess to trial
before an article III judge.76 The consent feature is thought to be a safeguard on the theory that the requirement of an article III judge is no more
than a due process right possessed by litigants, similar to other due process

rights that have long been held to be waivable.77 In addition, consensual
reference of cases to magistrates has been compared to the submission of
disputes to arbitration or to special masters, practices that do not violate
article II1.78

Despite these precautions, the constitutionality of the new bankruptcy
and magistrate systems remains problematic. By its terms, article III appears

to require that all courts established by Congress comply with its requirements. Accordingly, congressional power to delegate article III cases to
legislative courts has always been construed narrowly. The Bankruptcy
Reform Act and the Magistrate Act, however, permit non-article-III officers
to exercise the broad civil jurisdiction customarily reserved for the article
III district courts. Consequently, the compatibility of the new court systems
with the existing doctrine of article I courts and the arguments advanced for

their constitutionality must be scrutinized with special care.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF ARTICLE I COURTS AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE
BANKRUPTCY COURT AND MAGISTRATE SYSTEM

The doctrine of legislative, or article I, courts recognizes that rigid
adherence to the article III tenure and salary provisions may impair important practical interests in governmental flexibility.79 For example, by

precluding the discharge of federal judges once confirned in office, the tenure provision may effectively prevent Congress from disbanding a given
tribunal once it has outlived its usefulness.80 Similarly, the salary provision
74. See Bankruptcy Court Hearings, supra note 13, at 218 (statement of Att'y Gen.

Griffin Bell); Forum, supra note 15, at 371-72.
75. 28 U.S.C.A. ? 636(c) (1) (1980 Supp.).
76. See note 169 and accompanying text infra.
77. See note 202 and accompanying text infra.

78. See, e.g., La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256 (1957) (upholding use of

special masters in dictum); DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499,
504-05 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976) (consensual reference analogized

to arbitration).

79. See, e.g., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 396.

80. Territorial courts provide an illustrative case in point. The impermanence of territorial status makes congressional flexibility to restructure or dismantle territorial judicial
systems especially important. But, if territorial judges were guaranteed life tenure, Congress

would be forced to absorb them into the federal judicial system when the territory entered the

federal system, whether or not they were needed or qualified to be federal judges. See

Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 545-47 (1962).
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may prevent Congress from achieving needed economies.8' Both provisions
thus restrict congressional flexibility to deal with changing circumstances.

Moreover, because article III courts cannot hear cases outside the article
III subject matter jurisdiction82 and cannot perform ministerial functions,83

Congress may wish to establish legislative courts, which can adjudicate both
article III cases 84 and non-article-Ill matters while performing an array of

nonjudicial functions.85 Finally, through article I courts Congress can
establish expert tribunals for particular types of cases and change their personnel from time to time in order to preserve or enhance their expertise.86
In short, by authorizing exceptions to the tenure and salary provisions, the
doctrine of article I courts enables Congress to provide more flexible and

effective mechanisms for resolving disputes than the article III requirements
would permit.

Although the doctrine of article I courts is well established, the Supreme
Court has never marked the limits on congressional authority to establish
non-article-Ill judicial tribunals.87 Taken as a whole, the Court's pronouncements in this area suggest Congress has broad power to create such
courts in territories or special geographic areas such as federal enclaves, but
much more limited authority within the United States itself.
A. Territorial Article I Courts

The Supreme Court first articulated the doctrine of legislative courts
in the context of the territories in the 1828 case of American Insurance Co.

81. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933); O'Donoghue v. United
States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933) (congressional efforts to curtail judicial salaries during the
Depression); Will v. United States, 478 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (Congress must
appropriate funds for cost-of-living increases for article III judges), juris. postponed, 100
S.Ct. 1010 (1980) (No. 79-983).

82. See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 582 (1962); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.

Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937) (advisory opinions).

In only one case, National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582
(1949), has even a plurality of the Court ruled that article III courts can hear cases outside
the article III subject matter jurisdiction. Six Justices, however, rejected this view, id. at 605,
607 (Rutledge, J., concurring); id. at 643-44 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting); id. at 646-49 (Frank-

furter, J., dissenting), and it has not been asserted since.

83. See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 579-82 (1962) (article III Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals may not render advice to tariff commission on rates); O'Donoghue

v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 546 (1933).

84. Article I courts may hear cases falling within the scope of article III jurisdiction.

Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), suggests that congressional allocation of article

III judicial business to an article I court does not change the inherent nature of that business. Consequently, it is impossible to distinguish article III from article I courts on the
ground that the former exercise the exclusive power to decide article III cases while the
latter may only exercise judicial power in cases outside the scope of article III. See Hart
& Wechsler, supra note 27, at 397 n.4.

85. See Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 44243 (1923) (article I
local District of Columbia courts may set utility rates in the District); C. Wright, supra note 1

? 11, at 32.

86. The Tax Court is an example of such a legislative court. See Bums, Stix Friedman

& Co. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 392 (1971).

87. The Court expressly declined the opportunity to do so in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,

370 U.S. 530, 549 (1962).
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v. Canter.88 Canter upheld the validity of an admiralty judgment rendered

by a Florida territorial court comprised of untenured judges.89 Although
one basis for the decision was that territorial courts are not constrained by
article III because they do not exercise article III "judicial power,"90 the
Court's main premise was that article IV granted Congress the combined
powers of a local and a general government over the territories.9' This
plenary sovereign power included the right to establish courts, which, like
state courts, did not have to conform to article III requirements but could
nonetheless exercise some of the subject matter jurisdiction described in
article III, which includes admiralty cases.92

The Court has applied similar reasoning to sustain article I courts in
other geographical areas subject to exclusive congressional control, such as
the District of Columbia.93 Palmore v. United States,94 the Court's most

recent pronouncement on article I courts, upheld the constitutionality of the
article I court system in the District of Columbia95 as a valid exercise of
Congress's plenary sovereign power to legislate for that area. Responding
to a claim that only a fully tenured article III judge could constitutionally

try a criminal case arising under a District of Columbia law enacted by
Congress, the Court emphasized that not all cases arising under federal lax-v
must be heard by article III judges.96 Comparing the local District of
88. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
89. The losing party before the territorial court argued that because article III grants
admiralty jurisdiction to federal courts, it was unconstitutional for a non-article-IIl court to
resolve admiralty disputes. Id.
90. Id. at 546. Chief Justice Marshall said that legislative courts were "incapable of
receiving" article III judicial Dower. Id. In Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 578
(1933), the Court interpreted this statement to forbid article I tribunals from hearing any

cases within the jurisdictional scope of article III. This interpretation is plainly erroneous,
because it overlooks the territorial underpinnings of Marshall's formulation of legislative
courts. Justice Marshall was discussing the source of the power that authorizes a court, not
the nature of the cases adjudicated by that court. See note 84 supra. State courts, for
example, derive their power from state constitutions, and thus even when they are deciding
federal question cases they are not exercising and are incapable of receiving the judicial power
of the United States. Similarly, territorial courts receive their power from the plenary authority
of Congress to function as a state government in that territory. They do not derive their
power from the Congress acting in its national, federal capacity. They too, therefore, are
incapable of receiving article III judicial power, and are not exercising this power when they
adjudicate federal question cases. See Note, Masters and Magistrates in the Federal Courts,
88 Harv. L. Rev. 779, 782 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Masters and Magistrates].
91. 26 U.S. at 546. U.S. Const. art. IV, ? 3, cl. 2, provides: "The Congress shall have

Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory

or other Property belonging to the United States ...
92. 26 U.S. at 546.
93. Congress's power over the District derives from art. I, ? 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution.
For cases upholding other "territorial" courts, see Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298
(1922) (courts in unincorporated territories outside the mainland United States); Stephens v.
Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899) (United States court in Indian territory); United
States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76 (1894) (court of private land claims in the western territories);
In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (consular courts).
94. 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
95. In 1970 Congress passed the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal
Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473, which established separate local and federal
courts in the District. The local court judges are appointed for 15-year terms, and their
jurisdiction is similar to that of state judges. The federal courts in the District remain article
III courts. See 411 U.S. at 392-93 & n.2.
96. 411 U.S. at 401.
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Columbia courts to state courts, it held that the defendant, who had violated
a law of only local applicability, was no more entitled to an article III judge
than any other criminal defendant in a state court.

The reasoning of Canter and Palmore suggests that the territorial rationale for article I courts is extremely limited97 and cannot sustain nonarticle-IIl courts established in areas that are not subject to the plenary
authority of Congress. Other Supreme Court decisions suggest that any
article I court established within the United States to hear a broad range of
article III cases of national applicability would be unconstitutional.98 Under

these precedents, the nationwide magistrate system is unconstitutional, because it vests a full range of civil article III subject matter jurisdiction in

article I officers. The only possibilities for saving the system's constitutionality are the features of litigant consent and internal delegation.99
Similarly, since the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts may encompass a

great variety of article III cases, they too appear to be unconstitutional under
these precedents.

B. Subject Matter Article I Courts-the Limits of the Doctrine
Because its jurisdiction is tied to a specific subject of congressional

power under article I, section 8,100 the bankruptcy court may be justified
under a branch of the legislative court doctrine that permits the creation of
non-article-Ill tribunals when "necessary and proper" to resolve cases arising under the substantive powers conferred by article J.101 Thus, proponents

97. Although the law violated in Palmore was passed by Congress, the case does not
stand for the broad proposition that any case arising under federal law may be adjudicated
by non-article-Ill officers. Cf. Campbell v. United States Dist. Ct., 501 F.2d 196, 201 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974) (apparently interpreting Palmore this broadly). This
interpretation ignores the underlying territorial rationale for the decision in Palmore. See
text accompanying notes 120-23 infra. Indeed, the Court stressed that the requirements of
article III must apply "where laws of national applicability and affairs of national concern
are at stake," 411 U.S. at 408.

98. 411 U.S. at 408. For example, in O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 539-45
(1933), the Court indicated that when Congress establishes a permanent court exercising
jurisdiction coextensive with that of other article III courts, Congress must adhere to the

requirements of article III.

99. For an analysis of the constitutional effect of these provisions, see notes 187-223 and

accompanying text infra.

100. U.S. Const. art. I, ? 8, cl. 4, empowers Congress "[t]o establish . . . uniform laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."

101. The source of congressional power to establish this type of legislative court is the
"necessary and proper" clause, U.S. Const. art. I, ? 8, cl. 18, in conjunction with specific
article I, ? 8, subject matter powers. See Masters and Magistrates, supra note 90, at 786,

persuasively reasoning that since the jurisdiction of subject matter article I courts "necessarily
encroaches upon that of article III tribunals which offer greater constitutional safeguards to

litigants, the traditionally broad conception of 'necessary and proper' associated with

McCulloch v. Maryland should be supplanted in this context by a much narrower view." Thus,
Congress should be limited to " 'the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.'"

Id. at 786-87 ((citing United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955)).

When the functional needs supporting existing subject matter article I courts are examined,
it is apparent that the conception of "necessary and proper" is indeed extremely narrow in

this context. The "necessary and proper" rationale has been confined to subjects under
exclusive executive or legislative control. See notes 118-26 and accompanying text infra.
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of the bankruptcy court have likened it to the article I Tax Court'02 and

Court of Military Appeals,'03 both of which have been held to be constitutional. When the jurisdiction exercised by the bankruptcy court is examined,
however, it is apparent that it does not satisfy the limiting principles of the

major theoretical justifications for these subject matter article I courts.
1. The "Inherently Judicial" Test. Throughout the development of the

doctrine of subject matter legislative courts, the Supreme Court's analysis
has concentrated on the nature of the claims adjudicated by such tribunals.
Thus, in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,104 the

Court held that disputes between citizens and the federal government, as
opposed to suits involving only private parties, could be assigned to legislative courts. Similarly, in Ex Parte Bakelite Corp.,"05 it held that legislative

courts may "examine and determine various matters, arising between the

government and others, which from their nature do not require judicial
determination and yet are susceptible of it.""06 Although the "public rights"
rationale of Murray's Lessee and Bakelite may have been undermined by

subsequent decisions,'07 the concept set forth in Bakelite that Congress cannot relegate "inherently judicial" matters to a legislative court 108 remains
102. I.RC. ? 7441 (Tax Court an article I court). Although the Tax Court has upheld
its own status, see Burns, Stix Friedman & Co. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 392 (1971), the
Supreme Court has never ruled on its constitutionality. It has denied certiorari from circuit
court decisions sustaining the constitutionality of the Board of Tax Appeals, the administrative
predecessor of the United States Tax Court. See Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Commisioner,
358 F.2d 636 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 918 (1966); Martin v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d
63 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 920 (1966). However, an administrative tribunal within
the Treasury Department, even one that performs a largely judicial function, does not present
the same constitutional concerns as a full-fledged court, because "[t]he right of the United
States to collect its internal revenue by summary administrative proceedings has long been
settled." Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595 (1931). See note 182 and accompanying
text infra.
103. See, e.g., Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 686 (1973) (Court of Military Appeals
an article I court); O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969); United States ex rel.
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14 (1955); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857).
104. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856). The issue in Murray's Lessee was whether Treasury officials could audit accounts of customs officials. The auditing was judicial in nature,
and thus, it was argued, could only be performed by article III officers. The Court held
that article III presented no bar to this "necessary and proper" exercise of Congress's tax
collection power because it was a matter that, although capable of presentation in a judicially cognizable form, did not require resolution in a court. Congress was authorized to
choose the manner of resolution for these controversies, which were not "from [their] nature, . . . the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty." Id. at 284.
105. 279 U.S. 438 (1929). Bakelite held that the Court of Customs Appeals was an
article I court. The case arose on a petition for a writ of prohibition to bar this court from
hearing an appeal from findings of the Tariff Commission. These findings were ultimately

subject to presidential review, which meant that the court's decision would only be advisory,
and thus beyond the jurisdiction of an article III court. Article I courts, however, may
render advisory opinions, because they are not subject to the jurisdictional "case or controversy" requirement of article III.
106. Id. at 451.
107. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932) (rejecting the Bakelite test and
upholding the authority of an administrative tribunal to make factual determinations to
resolve a dispute of private rights). See also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977); Masters and Magistrates, supra note 90, at
788; Magistrates' Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 44, at 713. The plurality opinion in
Glidden, however, appears to reaffirm the Bakelite standard. See note 109 and accompanying
text infra.
108. 279 U.S. at 458.
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valid today.'09 This "inherently judicial" test apparently marks the limit of
Congress's power to establish subject matter article I courts.
As elaborated by the Supreme Court, the "inherently judicial" test is
primarily historical. If a particular type of controversy has traditionally

been resolved by courts at common law or equity, rather than by the legislative or executive departments, then it is "inherently judicial" and must be

heard in an article III court if heard in a federal court at all."10 Thus, for
example, Ex Parte Bakelite Corp. held that suits concerning customs collec-

tions could be assigned to an article I court because such matters had previously been determined by Congress or by executive agencies,"' and therefore were not inherently judicial. As a further example, under this historical

rationale, criminal cases and any suit involving a right to a jury trial would
be inherently judicial."12

Implicit in the "inherently judicial" test as applied by the Supreme
Court is the notion that the subject matter jurisdiction of these article I
courts will be precisely delineated."83 When the range of matters that a
court may hear is unlimited, rather than confined to a narrow class of cases
on a particular subject matter, it would be virtually impossible to conclude
that all such matters had been or could be relegated to executive or legislative

decisionmakers. Thus, it is apparent that neither the magistrate system nor
the bankruptcy court can be sustained under the "inherently judicial" test.
The 1979 Magistrate Act contemplates no subject matter limits, other
than article III's jurisdictional constraints, on the range of civil cases, including those requiring jury trial, that magistrates may resolve. Although
magistrate trials have largely been confined in the past to particular types
of habeas corpus and social security review cases,"4 the Act's unlimited

109. In Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), the Court, although overruling
the result in Bakelite, indicated its approval of the "inherently judicial" test. Id. at 549.
The constitutional status of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals was called into question in Glidden by the losing parties in federal district court
proceedings over which judges of these courts had presided by designation. In holding these
courts to be full-fledged article III courts, the Supreme Court concluded that the analytical
error in Bakelite was the assumption that because Congress could have committed the matter
to an article I court it must have created an article I court. Id. at 549-50.
110. In Murray's Lessee the Court indicated that only those controversies that had required judicial determination in England at the time the Constitution was adopted had to be
adjudicated by an article III court. 59 U.S. at 284. See Masters and Magistrates, supra
note 90, at 784.
111. 279 U.S. at 457-58. Justice Harlan echoed this conclusion in Glidden, 370 U.S.
at 549.
112. See, e.g., Comment, The Distinction Between Legislative and Constitutional Courts
and Its Effeot on Judicial Assignment, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 133, 159 n.172 (1962).

113. The opinion in Bakelite stressed the limited subject matter jurisdiction of article
I courts. See 279 U.S. at 452-59. Moreover, the Court justified the creation of the article
I Court of Customs Appeals and Court of Claims as a legitimate exercise of the specific
congressional powers to lay and collect import duties and to pay the debts of the United
States. Id. at 452, 458. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. at 548.
114. See, e.g., Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976) (review of administrative determination in Social Security benefit disputes). Discrimination cases are also frequently
referred to magistrates. See, e.g., Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1979) (sexbased employment discrimination challenged under 42 U.S.C. ? 1983 and 14th amendment);
Horton v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 590 F.2d 403 (lst Cir. 1979) (title VII sex dis-
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delegation scheme creates a basis for significant expansion of the practice.
Indeed, as district court caseloads continue to rise, systemic pressures are

likely to lead to an increasing number and wider range of cases referred to

magistrates,"15 who will thus be hearing many "inherently judicial" matters
heretofore decided only by judges.
Bankruptcy matters have historically been resolved by courts rather
than administrative agencies, because both summary and related plenary suits

involve contract, debt, and property claims rooted in common law. Consequently, there will be a right to a jury trial in many cases heard by the

new bankruptcy court."" Thus, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court

will comprise "inherently judicial" matters."7 Moreover, both bankruptcy
judges and magistrates will hear many disputes between private citizens, so
these court systems do not satisfy the "public rights" aspect of the Bakelite

"inherently judicial" standard.

2. The "Functional Need" Test. A second rationale for subject matter
article I courts would permit Congress to create a legislative court whenever

necessary to satisfy a special functional governmental need."18 According
to this rationale, if it is "necessary" for the "proper" execution of a power
committed to the legislative or executive branches that a matter be resolved

outside the channels of the article III judiciary, Congress may constitutionally

delegate the matter to an article I tribunal."19 Some commentators suggest
that this test is derived from Palmore v. United States,120 where the Court

said that the tenure and salary provisions may be disregarded only in order
to "accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress to legislate with re-

spect to specialized areas having particularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment." 121 When analyzed in its proper "territorial court" context,

however, it seems clear that Palmore did not adopt or approve this test. The
case upheld a legislative court system established by Congress in the District

of Columbia pursuant to its article I, section 8, power to govern the Dis-

crimination case); Sick v. City of Buffalo, 574 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1978) (discriminatory educational practices).
These referral patterns indicate that magistrates are too often employed to judge the
claims of the poor and other traditionally under-represented, politically impotent societal
groups.

115. Institutional pressures for increased reliance on magistrates to alleviate overloaded
dockets poses a risk of denial of article III judges to many federal litigants. See Article
III and Magistrates, supra note 5, at 1049-50. This is a real risk, as evidenced by projections
by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. See 1977 Hearings, supra note
47, at 499.

116. The new bankruptcy court is empowered to conduct jury trials. 28 U.S.C.A.
? 1480 (1979 Supp.).

117. Bankruptcy matters are therefore "inherently judicial" under the Bakelite standard,
because they have never been deemed susceptible of executive determination. See Bondurant,
supra note 27, at 236; Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 894, 916 (1930).
118. See Masters and Magistrates, supra note 90, at 786.
119. Id.
120. 411 U.S. 389 (1973). See, e.g., Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 66 (letter
from Prof. T. Sandalow to Rep. Peter Rodino).
121. 411 U.S. at 408-09.
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trict.122 The Court's remark about "specialized areas" seems directed solely
at geographic areas, rather than particular subject matter areas.123
A more appropriate precedential basis for this rationale are those Su-

preme Court decisions analyzing the military court system.124 For example,
the military courts have been justified on the basis of executive and congres-

sional supremacy in military affairs and the special need for swift and flexible

military discipline.125 The Court decisions examining the permissible scope of
the military courts' authority indicate, however, that the "specialized need"

justification for article I courts must be construed narrowly to avoid circum-

venting article 111.126 The only "needs" justifying the bankruptcy and
magistrate systems appear to be the imperatives to relieve district courts and

resolve disputes more expeditiously.127 Although valid, these concerns
hardly rise to the level of functional needs approved in prior Court decisions.128

3. The "Necessary and Proper" Test and Administrative Agencies.

Some commentators have advanced a third rationale for subject matter legislative courts, which suggests that Congress can create legislative courts
whenever such tribunals are "necessary and proper" instruments for exercising any of the powers enumerated in article I, section 8.129 In essence,
the argument holds that Congress can create a legislative court whenever it

can create an administrative agency.130 The conceptual basis for this view
is Congress's extensive power to select and limit remedies, which includes
the power to select and shape the forum in which remedies may be ob122. U.S. Const. art. 1, ? 8, cl. 17.
123. See Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 21.

124. See, e.g., O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
125. Masters and Magistrates, supra note 90, at 786 & n.48.
126. The Court has held that civilians may not be court-martialed for crimes committed

while soldiers, United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); civilian dependents
of soldiers must be tried in article III courts, Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); and that
even soldiers are entitled to an article III court when charged with offenses that are not
'service-connected." O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
In limiting court-martial jurisdiction to situations clearly implicating special concerns
of military discipline, the Court was motivated by the need to protect the jurisdiction of
article III courts from encroachment. Justice Black warned of this possibility in United
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. at 15.
127. See notes 15-22 & 35 and accompanying text supra.

128. Palmore provides scant support for an "efficiency rationale" for article I courts,

despite arguments to the contrary, see Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 66. In Palmore

the Court emphasized that Congress considered the creation of the local court system necessary to ensure efficiency and speed and to relieve the caseload burden on courts hearing
national matters. Congress was responding to similar problems of inefficiency, delay, and
overwhelmed district courts when it proposed the new bankruptcy court system and the
extension of magistrate's authority. The efficiency rationale, however, does not rise to the
level of constitutional principle. Palmore did not offer the efficiency rationale as a justification for depriving federal judges of article III tenure and salary protection. The efficiency
arguments were advanced in Palmore to explain why the local courts had been separated
from the national tribunals, rather than to justify nontenured local judges. Comm. Print
No. 3, supra note 5, at 23. The local article I courts upheld in Palmore were constitutional
not because they were more efficient, but because Congress possessed general sovereign
authority over the District of Columbia.

129. See Masters and Magistrates, supra note 90, at 786.
130. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 117, at 916-17.
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tamed.'3' Its precedential basis is Crowell v. Benson,'32 which upheld
the power of an administrative board of untenured federal conunissioners to

determine private rights arising under federal law, subject to appellate review on points of law in an article III court.'33 Crowell has been read
to permit creation of legislative courts to hear any federal question case,
provided appellate review is available in an article III court.'34
This argument is suspect on several grounds. First, Congress's power
to select remedies does not automatically confer power to establish article I
courts.'35 The language and purposes of article III require stringent limitations upon the latter power despite the general validity of the remedial
power. Second, it mistakes the import of Crowell. The decision held
that administrative agencies can constitutionally render binding determinations of fact.'36 Thus, the case stands only for the proposition that Congress
can delegate factfinding to non-article-III officers under the necessary and
proper clause, not that the clause permits broad delegation of article III
decisionmaking power to non-article-Ill tribunals. In addition, the opinion
emphasizes that factfinding is not an essential attribute of judicial power.137
Thus, Crowell provides virtually no support for the view that Congress can
freely delegate federal question cases to legislative courts.138
Moreover, in relying on administrative agencies as precedents for
article I courts, this argument gives inadequate weight to the functional differences between agencies and courts. In establishing administrative agencies pursuant to its power over remedies, Congress has not endowed them
with judicial power, which may be defined as the ultimate decisionmaking
core of the adjudicative function.'39 The exercise of judicial power encom131. Congressional authority to select and limit remedies has been sustained under Con-

gress's general power to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts. See Hart & Wechsler,

supra note 27, at 316-22, 332-34.

Professor Hart argues in his famous dialogue, however, that congressional power to
regulate jurisdiction by defining remedies is necessarily limited by greater constitutional

principles, such as due process. Id. at 332-35.
132. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).

133. Crowell arose under the Longshoreman and Harborworkers' Compensation Act.
Prior to the Act the compensation claim adjudicated by the agency would have been
brought as a common law tort action, in which liability would turn on legal determinations,
such as whether a duty of care had been violated. Under the Act, liability turned solely
on factual determinations, such as whether the seaman was in the employ of the shipowner
and whether he was performing duties on navigable waters. Crowell therefore does not
imply that common law legal disputes may be resolved by administrative agencies.
134. See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 5, at 1316-17.
135. See note 131 and accompanying text supra.

136. The Court emphasized that de novo review of all legal determinations would be

available in an article III court. 285 U.S. at 56-57.

137. Id. at 51. In support of this conclusion the Court cited the use of juries and
special masters to assist judges with factfinding. See Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Bankers

Trust Co., 318 U.S. 163 (1943).

138. Indeed, the Court itself later limited Crowell as merely "accept[ing] factfinding by
an administrative agency . . . only as an adjunct to an Art. III court" similar to a jury or
special master. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442, 450 n.7 (1977).

139. Cases discussing the permissible scope of magistrates' authority have developed
several formulations of the term "judicial power." See, e.g., Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S.
261, 270 (1976) (magistrate's role not inconsistent with article III because authority for
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passes far more than making factual determinations.140 At its minimum it
involves rendering binding decisions on points of law that affect or alter the

rights and obligations of parties and establish precedents for future litigants.
It also encompasses certain coercive powers, such as the power to render

self-executing judgments or to cite for contempt. Administrative agencies
possess neither of these attributes. Although they can adjudicate questions

of law,'41 their decisions are not final, but subject to review in article III
courts.'42 Similarly, although agencies can issue coercive orders, they can

making final decisions remains with district judge); Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 485-86
(1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (ultimate decisionmaking power is judicial function that cannot be delegated to magistrate); Horton v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 590 F.2d 403, 404
(lst Cir. 1979) (discretionary authority to enter final judgment is fundamentally an exclusive
power of article III courts); Sick v. City of Buffalo, 574 F.2d 689, 692-93 (2d Cir. 1978)
(retention of ultimate decisionmaking function in article III judges avoids constitutional
infirmities with magistrates' role); Reciprocal Exch. v. Noland, 542 F.2d 462, 463 (8th Cir.
1976) (article III forbids judges from delegating final decisionmaking authority). See Article
III and Magistrates, supra note 5, at 1032 n.50.

It has traditionally been asserted that administrative agencies may not pass on the
constitutionality of statutes. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975). One
commentator, however, has suggested that agencies should be permitted to make constitutional determinations when several factors, such as a normal agency policymaking role and
adequate record-developing procedures, are present. Note, The Authority of Administrative
Agencies to Consider the Constitutionality of Statutes, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1682 (1977). The
author of the Note dismisses article III objections by arguing that judicial review is always
available, permitting "the independent judiciary adequately to fill its assigned role." Id. at
1686. This argument shares the flaw of the broad reading of Crowell v. Benson discussed
earlier, in that it wrongly construes article III's requirements as applicable only to appellate
tribunals. More generally, it does not give sufficient consideration to the important policy
reasons for the tenure and salary guarantees in article III. See notes 153-69 and accompanying text infra.

140. As the Court emphasized in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932), factfinding
is not an essential attribute of the judicial power. Thus, juries, special masters, and ad-

ministrative tribunals are constitutionally valid.

141. See, e.g., O'Leary v. Brown-Pacfic-Maxon, Inc. 340 U.S. 504 (1951); NLRB v.
Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941), in
which administrative tribunals interpreted the meaning of statutory terms to determine

whether they covered a particular situation.

142. See 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise ? 3:10 (2d ed. 1978). Although in
his 1978 Treatise Professor Davis writes that agencies exercise "judicial power," id., he uses
the term to mean the ability to find facts from evidence and apply the law to these facts.
He does not use "judicial power" in the sense in which this Note uses the term-the ultimate

coercive authority to render a binding legal judgment.

Some statutes preclude judicial review of certain agency actions completely or condition
its availability on the exhaustion of administrative remedies. See, e.g., 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise ?? 28.01-.21 1958 ed. & 1980 Supp. The Supreme Court has sustained such
provisions even in the selective service context, where lack of judicial review may result in unjust
deprivation of liberty. See, e.g., Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946); Falbo v.
United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944) (draft registrants prosecuted for failure to report for
induction may not challenge validity of their draft classification as defense unless administrative remedies exhausted). The courts were not totally deprived of their constitutional

role by the selective service schemes in these cases, however. Habeas corpus was still available as a means for reviewing the agency action. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at

342-44.

When judicial review is precluded by a statute, it is usually in the area of discretionary
agency actions. See 4 K. Davis, supra, at 104. Even if a statute purports to deny judicial
review, however, there may still be recourse to the courts. The individual affected by the
agency action may refuse to obey it, and may then assert his defenses in a subsequent judicial
enforcement proceeding. See note 143 infra; Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 320-21,
342-44. The courts thus exercise their essential role in assuring that the law remains
supreme over agency discretion.
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enforce them only with the aid of an article III court.'43 Administrative
agencies do not, therefore, provide a precedent for broad-scale creation of
legislative courts.

A final difficulty with the "necessary and proper" argument as a stan-

dard for the limit on congressional power to establish subject matter article
I courts is that it is not actually a test, but merely an explanation of why the

legislative court doctrine came into existence.144 Indeed, a "limit" that
would allow Congress to create a legislative court pursuant to any article
I, section 8, power is no limit at all.145 If all that was needed to justify an
article I court was a congressional power to legislate for the subject matter

area, Congress would be able to make a wholesale delegation of federal
question jurisdiction to article I courts. Legislative authority over a subject
matter should not render article III inoperative for cases involving that area.
Otherwise, the principle of separation of powers embodied in the constitutional framework could be circumvented at the will of Congress.
C. The Need for a New Approach to Article I Courts

Although the magistrate system and the bankruptcy court exceed the

limits on article I tribunals that can be gleaned from precedent, this does not
necessarily resolve the issue of their constitutionality. The Supreme Court
has never indicated the full scope of congressional authority in this area,
and its pronouncements thus far offer unsatisfactory guidance.

For example, the "inherently judicial" test is largely unresponsive to the
question of Congress's ultimate authority to establish legislative courts
within the states. The test is primarily historical-it assumes that if a mat-

ter was once resolved by executive or legislative officers rather than the
courts, Congress may disregard the apparently mandatory tenure and salary
provisions once it delegates the matter to the federal courts. The inapplicability of the article III provisions in the absence of federal court jurisdiction,
however, does not necessarily render them inapplicable once jurisdiction is
conferred. Article III was not implicated when the matter was resolved
within the executive branch, but it is implicated once the matter comes
within the province of the federal judiciary. For example, the "public

143. The authority of administrative agencies to impose civil penalties was established
in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occunational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
The Court held that when Congress created new "public rights" under regulatory statutes,
the seventh amendment did not bar Congress from committing factfinding and enforcement
of these rights to administrative agencies.

See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), in which the Court
held that the seventh amendment did not prevent the NLRB from deciding whether unfair
labor practices, as defined by statute, had occurred. Under the administrative adjudication
schemes upheld in both Atlas Roofing and Jones & Laughlin, however, judicial review was
available and the agencies had to institute collection or enforcement proceedings in court
if the violator did not voluntarily comply with the administrative order.
144. See notes 79-86 and accompanying text supra.
145. See, e.g., Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 23-24. The jurisdiction of the new
bankruptcy court is a pertinent example of the expansiveness of this "limit." See notes
27 & 28 and accompanying text supra.
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Finally, although the "functional need" test properly recognizes the
governmental interests underlying the doctrine of article I courts,147 it provides no satisfactory criteria for determining when the needs of a particular
subject area are sufficiently "special" to warrant overriding the requirements
of article III. Presumably, a legislative findinrg of necessity would effectively

bind the courts; yet if the legislature can define necessity in this sense, then
very likely it could extend the "functional need" formulation almost as

broadly as it could the "necessary and proper" argument, with a similar
weakening of article III policies. Thus the test does not provide a satisfactory principle for limiting the doctrine of legislative courts.

These suggested limits are ultimately unsatisfactory for answering the
question of how far Congress may go in ignoring article III's requirements
because they fail to consider the constitutional policies embodied in that
article. Resolving a question of conflict with a constitutional provision,
however, should properly begin with an analysis of the purposes of the pro-

vision involved. The next section examines the policies of article III in
order to formulate a more satisfactory limit on congressional power to establish article I courts.

ITT. ARTICLE III LIMITS ON THE CREATION OF ARTICLE I COURTS

Congress has broad power to control federal court jurisdiction.'48 Indeed, it is not obliged to create any inferior federal courts,'49 and may
146. See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933); Masters and Magistrates,
supra note 90, at 785.

147. See notes 79-86 and accompanying text supra.

148. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850); Hart & Wechsler,

supra note 27, at 309-24.

149. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 81 (A. Hamilton); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S.

530, 551 (1962).
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abolish federal question jurisdiction altogether.150 When it does establish
a federal court, however, the terms of article III appear to be mandatory.'5'

At the very least, article III should be the norm for federal courts,152 and
the scope of congressional power to delegate jurisdiction to non-article-III
tribunals should be carefully limited to preserve the constitutional policies
embodied in the norm.

A. The Policies Underlying the Tenure and Salary Provisions in Article III
Like most of the compromises that emerged from the Constitutional
Convention, the tenure and salary provisions of article III serve a number of

purposes in the constitutional scheme of government. Well aware of the
evils that flow from excessive concentrations of power, the Framers sought
to limit the total power of the national government by allocating distinct

portions of the national power to separate governmental branches and by
structuring relations among the branches so that the operations of each

would confine the others to their proper spheres.153 The tenure and salary
provisions in article III are among the checks and balances that preserve

this separation of powers. The provisions ensure that the legislative and
executive branches will not be able to dominate the judiciary through coer-

cive manipulation of judges' livelihood and continuance in office.154 Moreover, by freeing judges from political influence, article III enables the

judiciary to prevent the political branches from infringing individual rights

or otherwise exceeding their powers.'55 Thus, by securing the independence
of the judiciary the tenure and salary requirements help maintain the proper
allocation of power among the branches of the national government.
Perhaps less obvious, but no less important, is the role of the tenure

and salary provisions in preserving the balance of power between the national

150. See, e.g., Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401-02 (1973); Sheldon v. Sill,
49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850).

151. See note 1 and accompanying text supra; Magistrates' Criminal Jurisdiction, supra
note 44, at 711-12.

152. See Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 33, 49 (letter from Prof. Herbert Wechsler
to Rep. Peter Rodino).
153. See, e.g., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 2-13 (summarizing the proceedings
at the Constitutional Convention regarding the role of the judiciary).

154. See The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (judicial function of checking other
branches requires tenure and salary guarantees in article III); Hart & Wechsler, supra note
27, at 9-11.

The Framers' abhorrence of a servile judiciary was attested to in the Declaration of
Independence, where one of the listed usurpations of the king was that he had "made
judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries."

155. See The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton) ("The independence of judges is equally
requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals ....").
Judicial independence is all the more vital today, because the federal courts are increasingly called upon to resolve disputes over the basic structures of our society's institutions and its allocations of wealth and power. Kaufman, supra note 59, at 681-90. For
example, judges have been asked to make decisions in the politically sensitive areas of

abortion, affirmative action, school desegregation, prison reform, and public welfare. See,

e.g., Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 Colum.

L. Rev. 784, 788-89 (1978).
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government and the states. The Framers envisioned a limited national

government that would operate upon objects of national concern, but would

not displace the legitimate functions of state governments.'56 Thus, although the Framers charged the federal judiciary with safeguarding federal

interests and maintaining the supremacy of federal law,'57 they also sought
to ensure that federal courts would not interfere with the legitimate opera-

tions of state judicial systems.'58 Implicit in the limited grant of federal

subject matter jurisdiction, this concern for the interests of federalism also
underlies the tenure and salary provisions of article III. An independent
judiciary not only can confine the p-olitical branches to their respective
spheres, but also can check those branches should they encroach upon the

states' domains.'59 By assuring an impartial and independent forum for
suits concerning the states, the tenure and salary provisions ensure that any
limitation of state prerogatives will occur by proper operation of law, rather
than through legislative or executive coercion. Similarly, by securing an

impartial federal forum insulated from influence by the states, the provisions

help retain the supremacy of federal interests in the federal scheme.'60 The
tenure and salary provisions of article III therefore help advance the vital
constitutional principle of federalism.

Furthermore, the provisions protect and promote the integrity of the fed-

eral judiciary as an institution. By insulating the judiciary from influence by

the political branches, the provisions safeguard judicial impartiality.'"' Thus
they facilitate accurate decisionmaking, assure proper protection for individual

rights,'62 attract the most highly qualified persons to the bench,'63 and enhance public confidence in the federal courts.'64
In addition, by incorporating the strict impeachment standard of article
II, section 4,165 the tenure guarantee protects individual judges from the
156. For a recent articulation of the principle of federalism, see National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See also Justice Frankfurter's discussion of federalism
and its effect on the structuring of the federal judiciary in National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646-48 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
157. See The Federalist No. 22 (A. Hamilton) (judiciary's primary task of providing
for the effective enforcement of federal laws includes protecting federal interests against
competing state claims).

158. Fear that state courts might be displaced by the federal judiciary was expressed
when the Constitutional Convention considered proposals for the establishment of inferior
federal courts. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 27, at 11-12, 21-23.
This fear also led to the provision in art. III, ? 2, limiting the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts. See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582,
646-48 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

159. Cf. The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (federal courts are the "bulwarks of a
limited Constitution against legislative encroachments" on both states' and individuals' rights).
160. See Article III and Magistrates, supra note 5, at 1032 n.55.
161. The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (security of tenure designed "to secure a
steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws").
162. Id. (independent judges necessary "to guard the Constitution and the rights of
individuals").

163. Id.; Magistrates' Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 44, at 701.
164. Id.; Senate Hearings, supra note 30, at 129 (testimony of Ass't Att'y Gen. F.M.

Vinson, Jr.).

165. U.S. Const. art. II, ? 4, provides that judges may only be removed for "high crimes

and misdemeanors." See note 2 supra.

584 COLUfMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:560
exertion of improper influences, disguised as disciplinary measures, by their
colleagues, and thus ensures judicial individualism.166 This is an important

value to preserve, because it enables federal judges to criticize old doctrines
and explore new principles, thereby facilitating the law's ability to develop

in response to changing conditions.'67 Orthodoxy and consistency in the
law are properly maintained not through disciplinary measures, but through
orderly processes of precedential reasoning and appellate review.168 By se-

curing an able, impartial, and diverse bench, the article III provisions ensure
that the federal judiciary will effectively perform its role in the constitutional
scheme of government.
The tenure and salary guarantees also serve values of due process, because by preserving judicial independence and impartiality they protect
federal litigants. Indeed, some commentators have argued that article III's
requirements are no more than a matter of due process.'69 They base their

suggestion on Justice Brandeis's dissent in Crowell v. Benson, where he argued
that cases could be delegated freely to legislative courts except when "the
constitutional requirement of due process is a requirement of judicial process."'70

However, the decision in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok'7' strongly suggests
that article III involves more than due process. Glidden involved judges
166. Kaufman, supra note 59, at 711-14.
167. The Supreme Ciurt attested to this principle in Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398

U.S. 74 (1970), which involved a district judge's challenge to the judicial council's authority
to regulate judicipl business in the district. Although it avoided defining the scope of the
council's power over district judges, the Court said it was an established principle that
independence is required "in any phase of the decisional function." Id. at 84. The Court
was referring to independence from influence by other judges, rather than independence from
the ther branches. See Magistrates' Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 44, at 703. Justice
Douglas dissented in Chandler because he thought the Court should reach the merits, but
he did clarify the Court's concern with independence from other judges. A federal judge,
he wrote, must be "independent of every other judge . . .. [N]either one alone nor any
number banded together can act as censor and place sanctions on him." 398 U.S. at 136
(Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Kaufman, supra note 59, at 714.
168. Kaufman, supra note 59, at 707.
169. See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 5, at 1340-60, 1366. Cf. Tushnet, Invitation to a
Wedding: Some Thoughts on Article III and a Problem of Statutory Interpretation, 60 Iowa
L. Rev. 937, 943-44 (1975) (suggesting that Palmore implies article III is merely a due process requirement).

170. 285 U.S. at 87 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See, e.g., TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460
F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir. 1972) (due process of law encompasses right of litigants to have
"cases" or "controversies" determined by article III judges). Chief Justice Burger has also
intimated that there is a due process right to an article III judge, which is satisfied so long
as a judge retains final decisionmaking authority in cases handled by magistrates, Wingo v.
Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 486 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Justice Brandeis's view was echoed in hearings on the 1968 Magistrates Act, where the
bill's sponsor argued that consent of the parties would vitiate any constitutional problems
with magistrate trial of minor criminal offenses, because "[i]f any 'right' to trial by [an
article 1111 judge exists, it is a due process right, which is waivable like other due process
rights." Hearings on S. 945 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 256 (1967) (testimony of Sen.
Tydings).
It has been suggested that the due process right to an article III judge is linked to
the seventh amendment guarantee to a trial by jury. See TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d
348, 354-55 n.37 (7th Cir. 1972). Under Justice Brandeis's formulation in Crowell, for
example, where there is a right to trial by jury there is arguably a "requirement of judicial
process."
171. 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
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Id. at 606 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 533.

175. The importance of the requirements in article III has led one commentator

suggest that the entire doctrine of article I courts is constitutionally dubious. See Comme

supra note 112, at 148-50. Although the concept of article I courts is probably too we

entrenched to be discarded, its shaky constitutional underpinnings do require strict constr
tion of the limits on the doctrine's scope.
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This article III policy analysis is both manageable by courts and properly sensitive to legislative prerogatives. Discovery and analysis of legal
policies is peculiarly within the judicial province, and courts can easily identify the policies of article III and determine their relevance in a given case.
Moreover, by requiring courts to consider constitutional policies, rather than

the validity of the "special need" advanced by the legislature to justify a
particular tribunal, this analysis maintains proper judicial deference to legis-

lative judgments. When Congress establishes a tribunal endowed with the
essential attributes of judicial power to adjudicate article III cases, the courts

must determine whether article III policies are contravened; if they are not,
or if the tribunal lacks the essential characteristics of a federal court, the
judicial inquiry should end unless other constitutional principles are involved.

Thus, the proposed analysis enables both the judiciary and the political
branches to perform their proper tasks.

Application of the article III policy analysis to existing legislative
courts demonstrates its utility for resolving the question of their constitutionality. Under this analysis, legislative courts established in United
States territories and other federal enclaves such as the District of Columbia

appear to be constitutional. In such regions, the federal government must
perform not only its usual functions as a national government, but also the
varied and specialized functions undertaken within the states by state and
local governments.176 Thus, Congress must establish a judicial system that
can exercise not only the article III subject matter jurisdiction of the federal

courts, but also the broad general jurisdiction, not limited to article Ill cases,
exercised by the state courts. Only through the device of legislative courts
can Congress establish territorial tribunals with the necessary breadth of
jurisdiction.'77

Moreover, unlike legislative courts within the states, territorial courts
do not implicate the policies of the article III tenure and salary provisions.
First, territorial judicial systems are not charged with preserving the separa-

tion of powers, because the Constitution explicitly commits the governance
of territories and federal enclaves to the sole discretion of Congress.'78 With

the legislature thus supreme, an article III judiciary is unnecessary to preserve
the role of the other branches, and could actually impede the legislature in
discharging its own role. Second, considerations of federalism are irrelevant

in the territories, because Congress does not act against a background of state
law in legislating for these regions. An article III judiciary is therefore

unnecessary to prevent federal displacement of state legal systems.179 Fina
ly, because territorial courts play no part in preserving the structure of our

176. See notes 79, 88-92 and accompanying text supra.

177. See Comment, supra note 112, at 150 (arguing that territorial courts are constitutional

because article III is inapplicable in the territories).
178. U.S. Const. art. IV, ? 3, cl. 2.
179. See, e.g., Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 21.
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limited constitutional government, they need not enjoy the extraordinary
safeguards provided by the tenure and salary requirements.'80

The military court system can also be constitutionally justified under
an article III policy analysis. Military courts hear only prosecutions of
servicemen for service-connected violations of the special code of military
law. Because the jurisdiction of these courts is sharply restricted to serviceconnected matters over which the political branches have pnmary control,18' they do not threaten the separation of powers; indeed, extensive
judicial intervention in military affairs might itself endanger the legitimate
prerogatives of the other branches. Similarly, because the states play no
role in military matters, military courts do not offend policies of federalism.

In fact, given the restriction of military jurisdiction to service-connected
matters, military courts closely resemble courts in federal enclaves and thus
pose little more threat to article III policies than do territorial courts.'82
B. Article III Limits Applied to the Bankruptcy and Magistrate Systems

Because the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and magistrates will
encompass a broad range of article III cases, these systems inevitably
threaten the framework of federalism and separation of powers guarded by
article III.

With respect to the bankruptcy system, although Congress has the legis-

lative authority to promulgate uniform bankruptcy rules of national applicability,'83 it has always been the province of the article III judiciary to in180. Professor Wright argues, however, that judicial independence is as vital in the
territories as in the states. He points out that because territorial judges try federal criminal
cases and resolve matters involving the United States, it is undesirable that they are dependent
on the Department of Justice for continued tenure. Instances of nonreappointment as a
reprisal for unpopular decisions are not unknown in the territories. C. Wright, supra note
1, at 37.

181. The Supreme Court has limited court-martial jurisdiction to service-connected
violations committed by noncivilians on military bases. See note 126 and accompanying

text supra.

182. It is a somewhat closer question whether the Tax Court comports with article III
policies. See Dubroff, Federal Taxation, in 1973-1974 Ann. Survey Am. L. 265, 272-85.
Because the Tax Court adjudicates suits for refunds of federal taxes it poses concrete threats
to the separation of powers. By dominating a tribunal that so directly affects the public
fisc either of the political branches might invade the province of the other. Similarly, because federal taxation affects state tax revenues, domination of the Tax Court might jeopardize federalism concerns. Furthermore, the absence of article III guarantees of judicial
integrity seems particularly incongruous in a tribunal that adjudicates claims between citizens
and government. In light of the "checking and balancing" purpose of the tenure and salary
provisions, adherence to them would seem more-not less-necessary in such a tribunal.

Masters and Magistrates, supra note 90, at 785.

On the other hand, however, the Tax Court does not exercise the full range of judicial
power. The court cannot enter binding judgments, but simply declares the amount a taxpayer owes. It lacks the coercive powers of article III courts. See Burns, Stix Friedman
& Co. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 392, 396 (1971). Thus, in function if not in name, it is
little more than an administrative agency and poses no greater threat to article III policies

than do those nonjudicial tribunals.
183. U.S. Const. art. 1, ? 8, cl. 4.

This subject matter authority alone does not authorize Congress to create a non-articleIII court, however. See notes 144 & 145 and accompanying text supra. Nor does the
determination that this congressional power can be implemented most effectively in a court
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terpret and apply these rules to assure uniformity. The judicial role in
bankruptcy cases involves balancing competing legal rights of private citizens
and reconciling the often conflicting statutory policies of rehabilitating

debtors and satisfying creditors. If Congress can constitutionaliy create a
bankruptcy tribunal whose judges are beholden to it for their salary and
continuance in office, it is likely that Congress will be able to exert virtually
unchecked control over bankruptcy policy, at the expense of individual pro-

perty rights. Such a result would upset the delicate separation of powers
framework, which looks to the judiciary to protect individual rights from
congressional encroachment.

The federalism concerns underlying article III's requirements are
threatened by the bankruptcy court because its jurisdiction will encom-

pass many claims grounded solely in state law.184 In bankruptcy proceedings, the role of federal law is merely to appoint an administrator
of private assets and to provide a federal forum for such actions. The pri-

vate assets themselves, however, include state causes of action.'85 The
tenure and salary protections in article III are therefore important in the
bankruptcy context, because by ensuring judicial independence they limit the
extent to which the political branches of the federal government can use the
judiciary to encroach upon state-created rights.

The Magistrate Act undermines the separation of powers principle by
vesting judicial power of a scope equal to that of district judges in decisionmakers whose term of office and level of compensation are controlled

by Congress. It is also incompatible with principles of federalism to the
extent that it empowers article I officers to overturn state court judgments on
habeas corpus petitions and resolve competing claims of state-created rights

in diversity cases. When the states grudgingly relinquished some of their
judicial prerogatives to the federal system, far from sanctioning or even envisioning decisionmaking power exercised by "parajudges" subject to con-

gressional control, they insisted on the requirements and limitations in article
JJT.186

staffed by specialists and separate from the overburdened district courts amount to a "spe-

cialized functional need" justifying article I status. As Professor Wechsler has pointed out,
the "particularized need" test in Palmore does not authorize an article I bankruptcy court,
because

the fact that Article I delegates authority to Congress to "establish . . . uniform
laws on the subject of bankruptcies . . ." does not without more permit the administration of such laws by federal courts unprotected by the tenure provisions of
Article III. The bankruptcy power is no different in this respect than the power
to regulate commerce or any other source of national legislation.'
Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 25.
184. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
185. See Plumb, The Tax Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws-Tax Procedures, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1360, 1468 (1975).
186. One commentator has noted that magistrates are sensitive to possible resentment
by state judges who are overturned by a mere magistrate, and thus may be more reluctant
than federal judges to grant post-conviction relief to state prisoners. Shapiro, Federal Habeas
Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 321, 366-67 (1973). In light of these
subtle pressures, a further expansion of magistrates' civil adjudicatory authority, which will
inevitably encompass even more state prisoner habeas petitions and civil rights actions against
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The general federal jurisdiction of the article I bankruptcy court and
the magistrate system cannot be reconciled with article III, because it con-

flicts with the all-important values of federalism and the separation of
powers. Consequently, unless their provisions for internal delegation of
jurisdiction, appellate review in article III courts, and litigant consent to an
article I judge actually mitigate the conflicts with these constitutional policies,
the new bankruptcy court and the expanded civil jurisdiction of magistrates
must be deemed unconstitutional. The following section examines the effect
of these so-called saving devices.

IV. INTERNAL DELEGATION, APPELLATE REVIEW, AND LITIGANT CONSENT:
DO THEY MAKE THE BANKRUPTCY COURT AND MAGISTRATE ACT
CONSTITUTIONAL?

A. Internal Delegation

Some proponents of the bankruptcy court and the expanded adjudicatory role of magistrates have argued that no separation of powers prob-

lems exist because jurisdiction is still vested in article III courts, with
magistrates and bankruptcy judges directly controlled by judges, rather than

Congress.187 This rationale collapses when applied to the new magistrate
system, since under that system district judges no longer conduct a de novo

review of a magistrate's recommendation, and a magistrate can enter a final,
binding judgment. Jurisdiction thus remains vested in the district court in

name only.'88 This defect is even more apparent in the bankruptcy scheme,
where district judges do not even have discretion to retain a bankruptcy
case.'89 To argue that the device of internal delegation satisfies constitutional concerns is to exalt form over substance.

state officials under 42 U.S.C. ? 1983, may result in a dilution of individual constitutional
rights.
187. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1968); Bankruptcy
Court Hearings, supra note 13, at 89 (testimony of Hon. Shirley Hufstedler), 216-18 (statement
of Att'y Gen. Gr-iffin Bell); Silbeiman, supra note 5, at 1305.
The Seventh Circuit recently summarized this argument while sanctioning a magistrate-conducted jury trial:
Article III commands that the judicial power of the United States be vested in
article III courts. The reference procedur-e employed in this case did not constitute a divestiture of this power. Magistrates . . . are subject at all times to
the direction, supervision, and control of the district courts. Thus, when a civil
case properly within the jurisdiction of an article III court is tried before a
magistrate pursuant to an order of reference by the district court, jurisdiction
remains vested in the district court and is merely exercised through the medium
of the magistrate.
Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir. 1979).
188. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit qualified its broad language in Muhich, see note
187 supra, by noting that de novo review ensured actual participation by an article III

trial judge: "In this case, the district court retained its jurisdiction over the litigation by
exercising its supervisory power in the form of de novo review, and by invoking its exclusive
authority to order the entry of final judgment. The strictures of article III were therefore
satisfied." 603 F.2d at 1251.
189. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
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Moreover, the internal delegation argument ignores the plain import
of article III's language, which authorizes article III judges, and not their

delegates, to exercise judicial power.'90 If article III could be construed
to mean that jurisdiction need only be vested in the first instance in an article
III court but could then be exercised by any assistant or adjunct body, the

tenure and salary requirements would be a nullity. In this respect, the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok that participation on

an article III court and exercise of article III decisionmaking powers by untenured judges would nullify the judgments of the article III courts should
erase any doubt that all cases in article III courts must be decided by article

III judges rather than by assistants or article I judges.'9'
Thus, the internal delegation argument saves neither the bankruptcy
court nor the magistrate system, because the range of their jurisdiction implicates article III policies. It is the scope of the jurisdiction exercised by
an article I court, rather than qualifications on its powers'92 or placement
as an adjunct to an article III court, that determines its constitutionality.
Indeed, far from overcoming separation of powers problems, internal delegation of jurisdiction from an article III judge to an assistant violates a cen-

tral precept of the separation of powers. The primary constitutional check
on the judiciary is congressional control over federal court jurisdiction.

Placing authority over the allocation of jurisdiction in judicial hands thus
transgresses a basic functional division among the branches of government.'93 This constitutional defect is especially apparent in the Magistrate

190. See Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 57 (letter from Prof. Thomas Kratten-

maker to Rep. Peter Rodino): "If the Constitution requires that a matter be heard by
an Article III judge, I would simply assume that this means he, not his delegate, could
hold jury trials or punish for contempt, or enter final judgments. Otherwise, such a

constitutional rule would have no independent significance."
191. Both the plurality and the dissent were in agreement on this point. 370 U.S.
at 533 (plurality opinion); id. at 605 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Professor Silberman

argues, however, that Glidden is not entirely apposite to the magistrate question, because
that case entailed a delegation of power to an alternative tribunal. Silberman, supra
note 5, at 1305. But Glidden involved judges from an alternative tribunal participating
in decisions of article III courts. Thus, the precise issue presented in Glidden iS raised
when magistrates exercise judicial power as part of an article III court. See Article III
and Magistrates, supra note 5, at 1035.

192. See Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 5, at 49 (letter from Prof. Herbert Wechsler
to Rep. Peter Rodino). Similarly, the article I structure cannot be validated simply
because Congress did not grant the court power to punish certain types of criminal contempt or to enjoin another court's proceedings. Although these limits do eliminate
serious separation of powers and federalism problems that would be raised if an article
I court, which is technically within the legislative branch, could enjoin proceedings in

federal or state courts or punish for criminal contempt, the bankruptcy court still retains
other judicial powers that implicate article III policies. It can enforce its judgments

independently of any other court, it can issue writs of execution, it can conduct jury
trials, and it can resolve constitutional and state law claims. Finally, it is the nature
of a court's jurisdiction, more than the full range of its power, that determines whether
it need be an article III court. Cf. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 552-61, 572-79
(1962) (irrelevant to article III status that powers and jurisdiction of Court of Claims
and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are somewhat limited).

193. See Article III and Magistrates, supra note 5, at 1038-39 & nn.80-82 (internal
jurisdictional delegation presents even more serious constitutional difficulties than jurisdic-

tional transfer from article III to article I courts).
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Act, which has no specific guidelines for delegating jurisdiction to magistrates.

The internal delegation scheme also threatens the second aspect of
judicial independence protected by article III's provisions. As noted
previously, the tenure and salary guarantees operate to protect judges from

coercion or discipline by their colleagues.'94 Under the Bankruptcy Reform
Act, however, bankruptcy judges are susceptible to control by other federal
judges because they are adjuncts to the district courts, their judgments may
in some instances be appealed to district judges, and they are subject to the

disciplinary review of the circuit judicial council.'95 The Magistrate Act also
poses a risk that judges may exercise subtle influence over magistrates' decisions by vesting authority in district judges to appoint magistrates, to
choose cases for reference, and to discipline and remove magistrates for
misconduct. A magistrate may be wary of rendering a ground-breaking or
unpopular decision if he knows the consequences may be future references
in only the most mundane or onerous cases, a curtailment of authority, or

failure to be reappointed. Any scheme relying on internal collegial control
of decisionmakers vested with judicial power may eventually undermine the
integrity of the judicial process.'96
B. Appellate Review

Advocates of the magistrate and bankruptcy systems have also argued
that delegation of initial decisionmaking power presents no article III diffi-

culties because appellate review is available in an article III court.19T Support for this argument is allegedly found in the constitutional scheme,'98
which actually assures only that an appellate-level article III tribunal will
be available to any given litigant, because Congress is not required to estab-

lish any inferior federal courts.'99 This reasoning begs the question, how-

194. See notes 165-68 and accompanying text supra.
195. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
196. See Kaufman, supra note 59, at 710-14. Widespread reference to magistrates
may also impair the integrity of the judicial process in additional ways. If particular

categories of cases are routinely handled by magistrates, development and exploration in
those legal areas may become stultified, because magistrate opinions are currently unpublished, and they lack the precedential weight of district court decisions. See Article
III and Magistrates, supra note 5, at 1053. In addition, public respect for the judiciary
as a highly qualified, impartial defender of the Constitution and laws may be undermined
by a perception that judges and lower-status magistrates are fungible. See id. at 1057.
197. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1364, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 11 (1978); Silberman,
supra note 5, at 1316-17.

198. Those who contend that article III is satisfied by provision for appellate review
also rely on Crowell v. Benson, reading that case as laying down the principle that no
conclusion of fact or law ever need be determined in the first instance by an article III
court. See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 5, at 1316. As discussed previously, however,
Crowell is a much narrower decision, resting on a recognition of the distinction between
administrative factfinding adjudication and the full range of judicial functions. See notes
136-38 and accompanying text supra.

199. For example, Professor Silberman argues that "[tlo the extent that article III
does impose certain requirements on the judicial process, it would seem to be satisfied
by appellate, not initial, determination by such constitutional tribunals. Indeed, the ori-
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ever, because the policies and provisions of article III do not become

controlling until Congress has created an inferior federal tribunal. Moreover, the appellate review argument implies that the tenure and salary pro-

visions need apply only to appellate judges, a suggestion totally unwarranted

by the language of article III, which encompasses any federal court estab-

lished by Congress.200 In addition, because the threats to the separation of
powers and judicial integrity envisioned by the Framers of article III flow
largely from control of judges' subsistence and tenure, rather than from direct manipulation of the law, appellate review is an inadequate corrective. It

reaches only errors of law, not the subtler corruptions, and, because only

a certain proportion of cases actually go to trial, and even fewer are appealed, the limited corrective available at the appellate level will not affect
the bulk of litigation.
Finally, the appellate review argument is without precedential foundation, and appears to be refuted by Glidden Co. v. Zdanok. In indicating that

an article I judge's participation in a trial in an article III court would render

the judgment void, the Supreme Court took no solace in the fact that appellate review in an article III tribunal was available.20'
At this point, it is apparent that the article I bankruptcy court does

not satisfy the article III policy test, and thus is unconstitutional. Rather
than eliminating conflicts with article III policies, the internal delegation and
appellate review provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act create additional
constitutional problems. The validity of the Magistrate Act is not so easily

resolved, however, because its requirement that litigants consent to a refer-

ence arguably makes trial 'by magistrate constitutional.202
C. Litigant Consent

Relying on the venerable case of Kimberly v. Arms,203 courts have traditionally validated consensual references investing masters or magistrates with
broad authority. In that case the Supreme Court held that upon the consent of the parties a master could hear the matter and report findings of fact

and law to the judge. The judge was to treat these findings as presumptively
ginal constitutional scheme, absent any inferior federal judiciary, assured only appeal to
an article III court." The virtually exclusive role once played by stiate courts in resolving federal question cases also "suggest[s] that the initial disposition of judicial matters
may be made by other than an article III tribunal when appeal to such a tribunal is
available." Silberman, supra note 5, at 1316-17.

200. See D. Currie, Federal Courts 120 (1968); Comm. Print No. 13, supra note 13,

at 65 (letter from Prof. Sandalow to Rep. Rodino). See also note 1 and accompanying text

supra.

201. Indeed, if appellate review were sufficient to remedy constitutional problems inherent in trial by a non-article-Ill officer, the Court could have resolved Glidden on the
substantive merits, for its own imprimatur would then have eliminated the jurisdictional
constitutional issue. Justice Harlan's conclusion that the article I/article III court issue
could not be avoided, 370 U.S. at 534, is therefore instructive.
202. Several commentators have concluded that consent is the constitutional cure-

all. See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 5, at 1350-54; Comment, An Adjudicative Role for
Federal Magistrates in Civil Cases, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 584 (1973).

203. 129 U.S. 512 (1889). See also DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.,

520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976).
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correct unless clearly erroneous.204 In Kimberly v. Arms and subsequent
cases that emphasize the importance of consent, however, ultimate adjudica-

tory authority remained with the district judge.205 "Judicial power" was not
vested in the article I officer. This fundamental distinction between past
cases and the Magistrate Act is illustrated by circuit courts' refusals, on con-

stitutional grounds, to entertain direct appeals from magistrate trials, even
when the reference was consensual.206

These difficulties may seem minimal if consensual reference is analogized to arbitration or other alternative methods of dispute settlement. According to this analogy, because the parties may agree to submit their controversy to an arbitrator or an alternative tribunal, bypassing the article III

judiciary altogether, they may also authorize a magistrate to resolve their
case.207 There is a crucial constitutional distinction, however, between arbitration and trial by magistrate. When parties select an alternative to judicial
resolution, such as arbitration, they choose not to invoke the "judicial power

of the United States" described in article III.208 Although arbitration awards

are traditionally final and binding, supposedly exempt from judicial scrutiny
on the merits,209 arbitrators may not issue writs of execution or contempt
citations, nor do they enjoy other attributes of judicial power. On the
other hand, when parties consent to trial by magistrate, they do not select
an alternative tribunal-their controversy remains within the province of the

204. 129 U.S. at 524.

Similarly, absence of consent has been deemed fatal to case-dispositive references. See
La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d
348, 359-61 (7th Cir. 1972).
205. Even under the "clearly erroneous" standard of review for masters' and magistrates' findings, the court still retains broad powers. For example, if either party chal-

lenges the officer's report, the judge may adopt, modify, or reject the findings in whole
or in part, or may seek further evidence. See 28 U.S.C. ? 636(b) (1) (1976); Silberman,
supra note 5, at 1330.
206. See authorities cited in note 46 supra.
207. See, e.g., DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499, 504-05
(lst Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976); Comment, supra note 202, at 592-94.
This argument stems from the Court's statement in Kimberly v. Arms that "[a]
reference by consent of parties, of an entire case for the determination of all its issues,
though not strictly a submission of the controversy to arbitration-a proceeding which
is governed by special rules-is a submission of the controversy to a tribunal of the
parties' own selection." 129 U.S. at 524.
208. Parties commonly contract to submit disputes to arbitration, thereby agreeing
not to seek judicial process. The binding effect of the arbitrators' award flows from the
contractual agreement to abide by it, rather than from an exercise of judicial power.
The Justice Department has been exploring proposals for compulsory arbitration of
certain disputes filed in court. See Address of Att'y Gen. Benjamin R. Civiletti Before
the W. Va. Bar Ass'n and the W. Va. Chamber of Commerce 6-7 (Aug. 31, 1979). If these
forced arbitrations are accorded the binding preclusive effect traditionally surrounding labor
arbitrations, with no guarantee of de novo judicial review or entry of final judgment by the

court, the system may amount to a denial of judicial process in violation of due process.
This is not to suggest, however, that once a dispute has come under judicial auspices it may

never be resolved in an alternative forum. Parties may agree to dismiss the court proceedings,
removing the dispute from the province of the judiciary, and then to refer the matter to
arbitration. Absent removal from the courts, however, the concerns underlying article III
remain implicated.
209. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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courts.210 They have invoked judicial p

officer of the court, enters a binding order in the name of the court. Thus,

trial by magistrate implicates the judicial power of article III and its underlying policies, whereas arbitration does not.
The fundamental premise of the consent rationale is that the right to
an article III judge is a due process right, inuring to the benefit of litigants,

and waivable like any other due process right.21' For example, it has been
argued that consensual magistrate jury trials are constitutionally proper because, if parties may waive the right to trial by jury altogether, they may

consent to a lesser form of jury trial.212 Even with consent, however, jury
trials presided over by magistrates may still present due process problems.
Under Justice Brandeis's formulation in Crowell v. Benson,218 the due process right to a jury trial in federal court is inextricably linked to a require-

ment of article III judicial process.214 The seventh amendment has always
been construed to contemplate jury trials supervised by article III judges.215
The judge helps shape the outcome by instructing the jury on the law, mak-

ing legal and evidentiary rulings, and weighing witness credibility. The
judge also retains the power to direct a verdict or to set it aside. De novo

review of the record by a district judge of a magistrate-conducted jury trial

may not be sufficient to interject the judicial role that is constitutionally required, because the evidentiary rulings and instructions that fundamentally
shape the verdict will have been rendered by the magistrate.216 Thus, in

210. Judge Swygert, dissenting in Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247, 1253 (7th Cir.
1979), notes that references to magistrates are readily distinguishable from alternative

dispute resolution forums:

It is important initially to recognize what this case is not. It is not a situation
where private parties have agreed between themselves to submit their differences
to a private dispute resolution process such as arbitration. Nor is it a case

where a party seeks federal court enforcement of the outcome of a private
dispute arbitration. It is not even a case where certain matters have been
separated out of a federal court action for initial reference to a specialized
factfinder . . . . Rather, this is a case where an officer other than a constitu,
tional judge performed one of the most traditional of judicial functions, that
of presiding over a trial (with a jury) on the merits, not in a private capacity
or as part of an isolated segment of an action but fully under the aegis of the
formal judicial power of the United States as defined in Article III of the Con-

stitution.

Some courts have not been so careful to discern these distinctions. See, e.g., DeCosta
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499, 50405 (lst Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1073 (1976); Article III and Magistrates, supra note 5, at 1047 n.132 (dis-

cussing DeCosta's error).

211. See, e.g., DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499 (lst Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976); Silberman, supra note 5, at 1350-54.
212. See, e.g., Sick v. City of Buffalo, 574 F.2d 689, 690 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1978).
213. See note 170 and accompanying text supra.

214. For this reason the expanded criminal misdemeanor jurisdiction in the Magi.-

trate Act, see note 44 supra, appears to be unconstitutional.
215. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1899).

216. Cf. Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974) (magistrate habeas hearings present
risk of de facto magistrate adjudication, because these petitions turn largely on evaluations
of credibility); United States v. Raddatz, 592 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100
S. Ct. 44 (1979) (No. 79-8) (in suppression hearing, where resolution depends on weighing
credibility of witnesses giving conflicting versions of events, due process right to meaningful
hearing before ultimate decisonmaker requires that article III judge, rather than magistrate,
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light of the "inherently judicial" function of presiding over a jury trial, a

litigant's right to waive a jury trial does not necessarily include a right to
waive having the trial guided by an article III judge.217
Even in nonjury trials, litigant consent to a reference may not eliminate
all due process concerns. As district court dockets become increasingly
clogged, refusal to consent to trial by magistrate may come to carry a price
of excessive delay, increased cost, and judicial annoyance at being saddled
with a case originally designated for reference. Faced with the realities of

these systemic pressures, the wise or less than wealthy litigant may feel
forced to "consent" to a reference.218 When this likelihood of forced con-

sent is coupled with the previously noted danger of intrusion into a magistrate's substantive decisions,219 it is apparent that the consensual reference
procedure may not be a due process panacea after all.

Assuming, however, that due process is fully satisfied-consent is freely
and intelligently given and the magistrate is free of any inhibiting over-

sight-the consensual feature of the Magistrate Act still is insufficient to
cure article III difficulties. As noted previously, the requirements of article
III are more than a matter of due process; they are a fundamental element

of the structure and constitutional role of the judiciary.220 Thus, these re-

quirements are "jurisdictional,"22' protecting judges, the public, and the
constitutional framework as well as litigants, and therefore cannot be waived

actually hear witnesses). See Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247, 1255 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert,
J., dissenting) (jury verdict shaped by rulings of presiding judicial officer; when magistrate
conducts trial, "the situation is hardly conducive to" meaningful judicial review, which is
"the saving feature in what appears . . . to be an abdication of the judicial function").
217. The argument that the right to waive an article III judge and consent to reference are indistinguishable fails to consider that when a litigant agrees to a magistrateconducted jury trial, the right of waiver has not been exercised at all-the litigant is still
receiving a jury.

218. The consensual character of references may disappear as burgeoning caseloads
make reference a routine procedure perceived by litigants as an acceptable norm rather
than an unusual device reserved for exceptional circumstances. Article III and Magisirates, supra note 5, at 1051 & n.152.
219. See note 196 and accompanying text supra.
220. See notes 153-75 and accompanying text supra.

221. In distinguishing between constitutional provisions that only create rights in
litigants and those that are "jurisdictional," the Supreme Court has said the test is
whether the Framers intended the provision to be "an integral and inseparable part of
the court." Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 297 (1930). In Patton, the Court

applied this test to the constitutional right to a trial by jury and concluded that it was
designed merely for the protection of defendants, and thus could be waived.
In this context the term "jurisdictional" means more than "subject matter jurisdiction," which includes the matters courts may hear once they are established. The tenure
and salary requirements, however, affect Congress's power to establish the courts in the
first instance. Thus, they can be defined as "fundamental jurisdictional" requirements.
Professor Silberman argues that because the tenure and salary requirements in ? 1
are distinct from the subject-matter requirements in ? 2 of article III, they are not
"jurisdictional," and thus magistrates may exercise article III judicial power when the
parties consent. Silberman, supra note 5, at 1350. This argument does not, however,
make the necessary distinction between the two types of "jurisdictional" requirements.

It also suggests, unrealistically, that the court as an institution can be analytically distinguished from the judges of which it is composed.
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by parties.222 Litigants have no authority under the constitutional scheme
to invest non-article-III officers with article III "judicial power."
The requirement of litigant consent therefore does not cure the constitutional defects of the 1979 Magistrate Act. The conflicts with the principles of separation of powers, federalism, judicial independence, and due
process inherent in a system of trial by magistrate can be avoided only if
the ultimate authority to exercise judicial power remains with the article III
district judge.223 Absent the protective device of de novo judicial review,
the 1979 Magistrate Act cannot be reconciled with article III.

CONCLUSION

The doctrine of legislative courts has traditionally been limited to tribunals in geographic areas controlled by Congress and to courts whose
jurisdiction extended only to matters of "public right" that were not "inherently judicial." The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and 1979 Magistrate Act go significantly beyond these limits, creating adjudicative systems
that violate the policies of separation of powers, federalism, and judicial
independence embodied in article III of the Constitution. Both Acts are
thus unconstitutional, because Congress's power to establish article I courts
is limited to situations that do not threaten article III values.
Lucinda M. Finley

222. There can be no better illustration of a constitutional provision that is an inseparable part of the court than article III, which seeks to maintain the integrity of the
judicial role in the constitutional system. Consequently, just as two adverse parties from
the same state cannot waive the diversity of citizenship requirement in seeking to estab-

lish subject matter jurisdiction, litigants cannot waive the "fundamental jurisdictional" requirement of an article III court.

223. For this authority to be meaningful, however, the district judge must do more
than search for gross errors, as in appellate review. The trial-level role of the article
III district courts must be preserved. This can be accomplished only if the article III
judge independently weighs the evidence and the law, relying on the magistrate's report
to focus the issues and guide the court, rather than dictating the ultimate outcome. See

Sick v. City of Buffalo, 574 F.2d 689, 692-93 (2d Cir. 1978); Article III and Magistrates, supra note 5, at 1043.

